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Stakeholder Collaboration
as an Alternative to Cost-Benefit Analysis
Karen Bradshaw*
This Article compares and contrasts cost-benefit analysis with
“collaborative analysis” in agency decision-making. While mathematical
models drive cost-benefit analysis, ongoing stakeholder negotiations drive
collaborative analysis. Cost-benefit analysis relies on economists
inputting numerical values into a model, whereas collaborative analysis
relies on the diverse perspectives of groups and individuals affected by an
agency’s decision. Administrative law scholars have exhaustively
researched cost-benefit analysis while overlooking widespread agency
reliance on collaborative analysis. This Article advances the novel
observation that legislatures and courts sometimes treat collaborative
analysis and cost-benefit analysis as interchangeable.
Administrative law scholars might find it unorthodox, even
irresponsible, to equate the deliberative process of average citizens with
numerical calculations performed by economists. Yet, collaborative
analysis works well in several contexts when numerical analysis does not:
where data are scarce, burdens are unevenly distributed, normative values
are at stake, and conditions are changing. Under such circumstances,
agency officials report that collaborative analysis creates better outcomes,
secures ex ante social approval of policies, provides adaptive decisionmaking, and reduces conflict and litigation risk relative to alternative
tools. Despite the benefits of collaborative analysis and its surprisingly
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widespread use, its potential remains largely untapped. In identifying and
defining collaborative analysis for the first time, this Article provides
agencies, stakeholders, and courts the tools necessary to understand
collaborative analysis and tap into its benefits.
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INTRODUCTION
Humans have managed risk since time immemorial. Our
ancestors weighed the benefits of gathering food against being
attacked by wildlife. Early humans did not make such choices by
plugging numbers into a formula; they talked in groups about what
could happen, drew on the wisdom of elders, and tried small
experiments to advance knowledge collectively.1
Humans still face risks, ranging from climate change to nuclear
disaster. We imagine that our mechanisms for managing risks have
evolved to become more sophisticated. In the modern
administrative state, agencies play a key role in regulating activities
to constrain risks to an acceptable level.2 Agencies make thousands
of decisions on acceptable risk levels every year, ranging from
vaccine recommendations to airplane cargo loads. Some agencies
use scientific and economic techniques unimaginable to our
ancestors, such as cost-benefit analysis.3 In countless cases, agencies
reliably make good decisions using a top-down framework
informed by quantitative tools.4
Yet, administrative law scholars tend to overestimate the
importance of numerical approaches to agency decision-making.5
1. These examples highlight the distinction between intuitive and analytical
reactions to risk. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 5–6 (2007).
2. To provide one example, consider the role of risk assessment and management in
the environmental context. The Environmental Protection Agency defines risk assessment as
“a process in which information is analyzed to determine if an environmental hazard might
cause harm to exposed person and ecosystems.” OFFICE OF THE SCI. ADVISOR, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, AN EXAMINATION OF EPA RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 2
(2004). “Environmental risk management seeks to determine what environmental risks exist
and then determine how to manage those risk [sic] in a way best suited to protect human
health and the environment.” U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Risk Management, EPA.gov,
https://www.epa.gov/risk/risk-management (last updated May 1, 2017).
3. Indeed, reliance on data-driven risk assessment has become the default practice of
the legal establishment. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 1; Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2353 (2001).
4. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1.
5. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION IX (2002); Kagan, supra note 3 (noting the “ever-widening appreciation of the
role of cost-benefit analysis and comparative risk assessment in the formulation of
administrative policy”); Alan H. Sanstad, Abating Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Electric Power
Generation: Model Uncertainty and Regulatory Epistemology, 44 J. L. STUD., S423, S423 (2015)
(“Computational modeling has become a primary regulatory methodology in the decades
since the modern American environmental policy regime was established . . . .”). As a field,
administrative law tends to focus on a set of agencies whose policy choices lend themselves
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In truth, agencies do not use cost-benefit analysis to inform the vast
majority of regulatory decisions. Fewer than two percent of
regulations promulgated in the past ten years, or 609 of 36,255 final
rules, resulted from cost-benefit analysis.6 How do agencies
formulate policy for the other ninety-eight percent of regulations?7
In 2017, the Administrative Conference of the United States
commissioned an Office of the Chairman Report to study how
agencies make policy choices and manage risk without using costbenefit analysis.8 The Report showed that thirteen federal land and
resource management agencies rarely, if ever, used numerical
decision-making tools to guide policy. Instead, agencies relied
heavily on “stakeholder collaborations” as a substitute for formulabased, numerical decision-making. In a recent article, I provided a
descriptive, longitudinal overview of stakeholder collaborations.
This Article builds upon that foundational work to advance a bold
claim: In practice, agencies, legislatures, and courts have privileged
collaborative analysis as equivalent to cost-benefit analysis.
Administrative law scholarship should add collaborative analysis
to the cannon of agency decision-making tools.
“Collaborative analysis” describes agencies’ use of groups of
diverse
non-agency
stakeholders
to
develop
policy
recommendations. It derives from familiar participatory
governance tools, such as responsive regulation, collaborative
adaptive management, and stakeholder collaborations.9 This
Article advances a novel claim, however: The relational process of

to cost-benefit analysis, such as the Environmental Protection Agency. Administrative law
scholarship tends to overlook the federal land and resource management agencies that
employ the tool of collaborative analysis discussed in this article, which includes agencies
like the U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and National Park Service.
6. OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 2017
DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT (2017). Some scholars
suggest that the two percent of decisions guided by cost-benefit analysis are the most
important decisions because they surpass a certain dollar threshold.
7. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91 S.
CAL. L. REV. 195, 197-200 (2018); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Norming in
Administrative Law, 68 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1384-85 (2019) (describing agencies “norming” by
choosing standard industry practices to set a regulatory level).
8. KAREN BRADSHAW, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STAKEHOLDER
COLLABORATIONS FOR MANAGING LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2017).
9. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, infra note 109, at 87; Christine Parker, Twenty Years of
Responsive Regulation: An Appreciation and Appraisal, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE. 2, 7 (2013).
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weighing choices in groups—”collaborative analysis”—is
analogous to cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, I argue that courts
should—and do—consider these tools as interchangeable, both
being evidence of reasoned decision-making and appropriate for
different circumstances. Collaborative analysis can serve as a
complement to, or even substitute for, cost-benefit analysis.
Human analytical potential extends beyond science and
numbers. Discounting decision-making tools outside of costbenefit analysis leaves much on the table.10 When risk is great and
unknowable, we should rely on the tools that our ancestors used to
survive attacks by wild animals: human relationships, pooled
information, and an openness to constant learning in response to
the natural environment.11 Agencies do precisely this by using
collaborative analysis to incorporate diverse sources of information
and analysis.
This Article compares and contrasts collaborative analysis with
cost-benefit analysis. I grapple with Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein’s behavioral economics arguments against public
participation. Collaborative analysis can lead to more accurate
valuation assessments, Pareto superior outcomes, inclusiveness,
increased social acceptance, reduce polarization, resource pooling,
and responsive policy.12 The tool is, however, subject to serious
concerns, including democratic considerations, capture, a lack of
inclusiveness, and problematic decision quality.13
Doctrinally, this Article makes a surprising argument: Existing
law allows agencies to defend decisions in litigation using
collaborative analysis, just as they use cost-benefit analysis or even
an Environmental Impact Statement to support a decision.14 This
Article traces the basis for this claim in statutory language and
caselaw. Vitally, it also sets forth a framework to address the
interwoven questions of (1) the conditions under which
10. See infra Sections II.B.3 (discussing the diverse information offered
by traditional ecological knowledge, relational feminism, ecofeminism, resource-users,
and employees within an industry—none of which are captured through quantitative
data approaches).
11. See Edward H. Hagen & Peter Hammerstein, Game Theory and Human Evolution: A
Critique of Some Recent Interpretations of Experimental Games, 69 THEORETICAL POPULATION
BIOLOGY 339, 340–41 (2006).
12. See infra Section II.A.
13. See infra Section II.B.
14. See infra Section III.
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collaborative analysis are appropriate, and (2) when collaborative
analysis is sufficiently inclusive.15
Courts should read statutes about agency decision-making in
concert with laws requiring stakeholder input. Courts should also
afford deference to agencies’ decisions based on information
gathered through democratic participation.16 This shifts judicial
inquiry away from second-guessing empirical risk assessments and
toward evaluating the agencies’ procedural fairness.17 Ostensibly
neutral qualitative tools are largely incomprehensible to nonexperts;18 they can serve as a smokescreen for highly politicized
agency decisions and judicial analysis.19 In contrast, courts are
expert in evaluating procedure and democratic inclusion. Thus,
democratic legitimacy may require broadened, formalized
acceptance of citizen input as a valid part of policy analysis.20
Part I provides a case study of an agency changing from datadriven analysis to collaborative analysis. It expands upon the case

15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.; see also Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138

U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (1990) (“[C]ourts simply should not play a significant role in public
risk assessment and management, partly because they share the uninformed popular
mindset and partly because they are inept assessors and managers in any event.”);
Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278 (1985) (“[T]he judicial system is . . . incapable of engaging in
the aggregative calculus of risk created and risk averted that progressive publicrisk management requires.”).
18. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, 115 ETHICS 351, 380
(2005); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (1971) (describing the use of mathematics in criminal trials as
“casting a spell” over courts and juries, even when the methodology and outcomes are
deeply flawed).
19. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 899, 902 (2015) (“[Cost-benefit analysis can] provide
camouflage, reducing the transparency of a rulemaking process . . . [and can] (1) obscure the
issues at play, (2) raise the risks for lawmakers to question regulators, (3) shift power from
Congress to regulators, (4) hide risk seeking, and (5) favor factions in distributional struggles
among lawmakers.”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 781 (2008); Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of
Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L. 1083, 1097-98 (2007); cf. Jody Freeman & Adrian
Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 S. CT. REV. 51, 96
(acknowledging politicization but arguing that the Supreme Court pushed back against it
through “expertise-forcing”).
20. Practically, agency collaboration with stakeholders improves substantive
decisions, lessens litigation risk, builds trusts, and increases social acceptance of policies. See
infra Section II.A.
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study to define collaborative analysis as the practice of obtaining
ongoing input from diverse stakeholders.
Part II compares and contrasts cost-benefit analysis with
collaborative analysis. It highlights the benefits of collaborative
analysis relative to cost-benefit analysis, such as producing more
inclusive decision-making and better valuations. It acknowledges,
however, concerns with the tool, emphasizing best practices to
include marginalized populations and avoid agency capture.
Defining the situations in which collaborative analysis is (and is
not) appropriate provides crucial insight into the benefits and
limitations of this approach.
Part III presents a novel doctrinal analysis of how courts can
assess the legality of agencies relying on collaborative analysis.
Indeed, I argue that courts are better positioned to analyze the
procedural fairness of collaborative analysis than the empirical
questions imbedded in cost-benefit analysis. Despite its
widespread use, collaborative analysis’s potential is not yet fully
realized. I conclude by providing suggestions for how it can be
expanded to guide policymaking in other areas.
I. REVEALING THE TOOL OF COLLABORATIVE ANALYSIS
This Part presents a specific, real-world case study of an agency
transitioning from data-driven management to collaborative
analysis (Section I.A). It then expands upon this particular example
to provide a generalized overview of agencies’ use of stakeholder
collaborations and the resulting collaborative analysis (Section I.B).
A. Case Study: The Western Arctic Caribou Herd Working Group
In Alaska, the caribou, or North American reindeer, are neither
domesticated nor herded. Yet many stakeholders have strong
interests in caribou herd management, including commercial
hunting guides, recreational hunters, wildlife conservationists, and
Alaskan Native Communities. Caribou migrate through a large
landscape owned by a mix of federal, state, native, corporate, and
private landholders.21 Landowners have differing, sometimes
21. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN 6
(2011). Wildlife habitat for large mammals frequently spans many diverse landowners, a
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conflicting, approaches to wildlife management.22 State and federal
agencies divide management responsibilities according to a
complicated system.
This case study focuses on agency decision-making regarding
caribou management. It begins by situating the past and current
importance of the caribou in indigenous Alaskan culture. Then, it
describes a series of disastrous top-down, numerically driven
agency decisions that decimated entire herds of caribou. Finally,
agency officials with local ties to Alaskan Native Communities
developed an alternative decision-making tool—collaborative
analysis—that complemented numerical modeling to lead to better
agency management.
1. The historical development of herd management
Alaskan Native communities have hunted caribou in Alaska
since time immemorial. After the United States purchased the
Alaskan territory from Russia, the U.S. government gradually
began regulating wildlife, including the caribou. These efforts
largely displaced traditional hunting practices and incorporated
non-native hunting uses.
Alaskan Native hunting practices differed sharply from those
endorsed by state fish and game agencies within the continental
United States.23 For example, Alaskan Native communities
historically took many animals during a brief period, consistent
with the migratory patterns.24 Traditionally, hunters would
station themselves by a river and harvest the caribou as they swam
to maximize the take.25 Such hunting practices reflect
traditional ecological knowledge, an oral history governing the

phenomenon discussed in Challie Facemire & Karen Bradshaw, Biodiversity Loss Viewed
through the Lens of Mismatched Property Rights, available at https://www.adfg.alaska.gov/
static/research/plans/pdfs/wah_management_plan_final_2011.pdf.
22. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., supra note 21.
23. There were, of course, traditional Native American practices within
the continental United States, which Western settlers violated, supplanted, and
eventually overwrote.
24. Interview 16 (on file with the author); see also Ray Barnhardt & Angayuqaq Oscar
Kawagley, Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Alaska Native Ways of Knowing, 36
ANTHROPOLOGY & EDUC. Q. 8, 8–9 (2005).
25. Id.
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human relationship with the natural world.26 But, these
methods contrasted sharply with Western notions of ethical
hunting practices.
In the 1900s, Alaskan game wardens used fines, arrests, and
gun confiscation to punish traditional hunting practices. Such
enforcement mechanisms bred distrust between Alaskan Native
communities and Department officials. Against the backdrop of
sharply different perspectives and a century of distrust, state and
federal agencies in Alaska continue to manage wildlife upon which
the lives of some rural Alaskan Native communities depend.27
In the 1970s, The Alaska Department of Game and Fish
(“ADFG”) dramatically overestimated the size of the herd and
issued many hunting permits over the objections of the Alaskan
Native communities, which resulted in the largest failure in the
history of state wildlife management. Two caribou herds
experienced total population collapse—hundreds of thousands of
caribou died. The result was “one of the worst management
debacles ever in the State of Alaska, ever.”28 The population
collapse had devastating effects on rural Alaskan Native
communities, which depended upon the herds as a primary food
source. Several American citizens starved to death.29

26. Western scientists and courts are increasingly recognizing traditional ecological
knowledge as a valid form of scientific information. Id. at 9 (“Until recently, there was very
little literature that addressed how to get Western scientists and educators to understand
Native worldviews and ways of knowing as constituting knowledge systems in their own
right, and even less on what it means for participants when such divergent systems coexist
in the same person, organization, or community.”).
27. A series of laws enacted by Congress in the 1970s, such as the Alaskan National
Interest Lands Conservation Act, embedded subsistence hunting rights for Alaskan Natives
and non-native rural Alaskans into federal law. These rights are managed by the Subsistence
Resource Commission, which reports to Federal Subsistence Regional Advisory Councils
and the Federal Subsistence Board. Alaska maintains a parallel system, which centralizes
authority in the Board of Game and Fish and incorporates a broader focus on non-native
users, including game hunters from other states or countries.
28. Telephone Interview with Jim Dau, Wildlife Biologist for Alaska Department of
Fish and Game (retired) (July 25, 2017) (on file with author), quoted in BRADSHAW, supra note
8 at 13.
29. Today, caribou remain the primary source of sustenance for between forty and
fifty remote Alaskan Native communities, which can only be reached by airplane, boat,
snowmachine, or sled dog team. Villagers hunt caribou using snowmachines in the winter
and powerboats or all-terrain vehicles in the summer and fall. ERNEST S. BURCH JR., CARIBOU
HERDS OF NORTHWEST ALASKA, 1850–2000, at 45 (Igor Krupnik & Jim Dau eds., 2012).
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2. “Scientific” management at odds with social realities
After the population collapse, a complex arrangement between
Federal Subsistence Advisory Boards and the Alaskan Board of
Game emerged to govern hunting and fishing regulations. Various
stakeholders would argue before the State Board of Game, which
was “not very productive” because the groups had different
interests, essentially leaving management to the game boards.30
The Agency turned toward a scientific approach to herd
management—releasing annual hunting licenses by using
mathematical models of herd size based on field data collected by
biologists in helicopters over a few days. The licensure process was
a top-down effort that prioritized data while neglecting many onthe-ground realities of rural Alaskan life.31
For instance, the agency refused to give permits to at least one
Alaskan Native community because they did not appear at an
agency-sponsored meeting. Although the agency had failed to
notify that community about the meeting, the agency nevertheless
refused to issue hunting licenses to the group, making them choose
between breaking state hunting laws or starving. In 1970, the
Western Arctic Herd numbered 243,000, but dropped to 75,000 by
1976. There was tremendous distrust and anger among the various
stakeholders. It was clear that using the best-available scientific and
mathematical models for herd management was not working.
In 1994, ADFG hosted a multi-day workshop to determine
objective ways to assess caribou harvest levels.32 After hours and in
the hallways between sessions, participants began to discuss
creating a working group devoted to the issue. Collaborative
strategies were in their infancy in Alaska. Some state employees
were familiar with the concept from their experience engaging with
Canadians, whom a former state wildlife biologist described as “a
decade ahead of Alaskans in terms of working groups.”33
Eventually, lower-level agency employees from rural Alaska
gradually formulated a different model for generating social

30.
31.
32.
33.

664
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acceptance of herd management policies.34 They relied on
relationships, creating a stakeholder collaboration that met
regularly to discuss herd conditions. State and federal agency
officials, hunting guides, and representatives from the Alaskan
Native communities were some of the parties who comprised the
stakeholder collaboration.
3. The emergence of a stakeholder collaboration
A small group hammered out the concept and structure of the
Western Arctic Caribou Herd Working Group (WACHWG), the
focus of which was to have field biologists and affected parties from
the primary interests come together. The group sought to connect
researchers and those reliant on caribou and to encourage them to
have an informal, “nuts and bolts” discussion of the population, to
offer a unified set of recommendations to the Board of Game that
would improve its decision-making. A founding member of
WACHWG noted, “We never envisioned anything formal. We
wanted it to be informal, because that’s the way villages work[;]
that’s what people were comfortable with.”35 The WACHWG
intentionally did not have a chair, seeking to avoid hierarchy. It also
met in various rural villages, which allowed the local villagers to
attend meetings.
For several years, a group of up to nine people would gather for
a day in Kotzebue or another rural location to discuss forming the
group. As the idea solidified, it found a receptive source in John
Coady, the Supervisor for Region 5 of the ADFG, who lived
through the caribou population collapse debacle in the 1970s.
Coady allocated a modest amount of the existing regional budget
to convene meetings, assigned an employee to the collaboration,
and, as one official noted, “had enough moxie for people to take
this seriously.”36

34. ROBERT J. MCMONAGLE, CARIBOU AND CONOCO: RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS IN ALASKA’S ANWR AND BEYOND 2 (2008) (“[U]sing strictly cost-benefit analysis to
‘solve’ conflicts with conflicting energy and environmental implications is a problematic way
to go. Actual costs and benefits in these equations tend to be too nebulous or demonstrably
one-sided.”).
35. Dau, supra note 28.
36. Id.
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Early members of the collaboration were poignantly aware of
the challenges involved in forming a credible group. A former
ADFG employee recalls:
It was really tough early on. We were acutely aware of the
problems with us picking and choosing representatives of the
various user groups, indigenous people, guides, transporters, and
industry. We realized that if we picked the representatives of the
group, it would lose a lot of its credibility. Our hand-picked
representatives would just be seen as people friendly to Fish and
Game, which would undermine the group.37

The group eventually decided to include twenty voting chairs
representative of the public. It recognized that it could not give a
seat at the table to every interest, so it began with the groups most
directly dependent on the caribou and worked out from there.
There were forty to fifty communities that depended upon caribou,
so the Board adopted the advisory system developed by the State
of Alaska many years before, as a model to structure native
subsistence users’ representation.38
During initial discussions on establishing some type of comanagement group, some Native Alaskan participants expressed
their desire to have legal authority to promulgate regulations.39
They wanted to be equal partners with the State of Alaska and
federal agencies in managing the caribou herd. Agency officials
responded that co-management was impossible, as there was no
way that state or federal agencies could cede or share legal
management authority with them or any other entity.40 Because of
the inability for agencies to share authority, two leaders of the
Alaskan Native community users dropped out of the group.41
There was also internal resistance within the agency, as some
employees feared that WACHWG could become too influential and
undermine agency influence. Initially, some federal agencies were
mildly supportive, but did not have time or money to participate
fully in the 1990s.42 One interviewee remembers that a U.S. Fish and

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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Wildlife Service manager “came to every meeting [with the
attitude] ‘We can’t do this. We can’t do this. There is no legal way
to share authority. There is no way to do this.’”43
Working slowly to build trust and overcome resistance, the
WACHWG eventually made progress. Initially, agency organizers
envisioned meetings as an opportunity to defend agency decisionmaking. They imagined that agency biologists would educate
indigenous hunters about herd conditions to create greater social
acceptance when the tighter hunting restrictions were necessary.
Over time, agency officials stopped talking and started
listening. Hunters and Alaskan Native communities shared on-theground observations and traditional ecological knowledge with
biologists and agency officials.
WACHWG created a subcommittee to draft a cooperative
management plan, which was released in 2003 and continues to be
periodically reviewed and updated.44 The plan envisions all
stakeholders—including state, federal, corporate, and private
landowners and resource managers—working together to carry out
the group’s goals by developing cooperative agreements, sharing
resources, and providing support in implementation.45
Today, WACHWG is a collaboration between stakeholders
interested in the long-term conservation of the Western Arctic
Caribou Herd, the ecosystem upon which the herd is dependent,
and the traditional and other uses thereof.46 Stakeholders include
“subsistence users, other Alaskan hunters, reindeer herders,
hunting guides, transporters, and conservationists” along with
agency staff managers, natural resource managers, and biologists
who act as consultants to the group—all of whom are
knowledgeable about, interested in, and care for the management
and conservation of the Western Arctic Caribou Herd.47
The group holds a meeting once a year, allowing biologists to
update stakeholders on the status of the health and population of

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., supra note 21, at 1.
Id. at 6, 30.
W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., Mission, https://westernarcticcaribou.
net/mission/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
47. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., About, https://westernarcticcaribou.
net/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
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the caribou, the range conditions, and other matters affecting the
herd.48 Meetings focus on management and information transfer,
with people talking about the issues they observe with respect to
caribou. A typical meeting might include a specialist presenting
information on the impact of climate, transportation, or public land
use planning, or elders addressing the group drawing upon
traditional ecological knowledge disseminated through the
generations.49 There is a technical committee that meets a day prior
to the meeting to discuss “nuts and bolts, biology and ecology,”50
along with other subcommittees, which meet as needed throughout
the year.51
One founder notes that WACHWG has shifted away from the
original conception of connecting field biologists with resource
users and towards including agency staff members with little onthe-ground experience:
Now, there may be 75-100 agency staff at the annual meetings,
some administrators and some biologists—none of whom more
than occasionally do field work on this caribou herd. It has
become a must-attend annual meeting populated mostly by
agency staff who have little direct involvement working with this
caribou herd, except for administrative stuff.52

The informal tenor of early meetings became more structured over
time: today there is a chair, co-chair, facilitator, and several notetakers for each meeting.53
Although WACHWG has over 100 people attending meetings,
a National Park Service biologist believes that the “delicate balance
between being unwieldy and everyone having a voice” is struck
largely through having a facilitator and co-chairs who are adept at
moving the ball forward.54 The location shifted from a rotating
schedule of rural villages to Anchorage to limit the expenses of
agency officials attending. WACHWG has collaborated with
different federal agencies to implement a cooperative management

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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Interview 1, supra note 30.
W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., About, supra note 47.
Dau, supra note 28.
Id.
Interview 3 (on file with the author).
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plan to effectuate cooperation among resource management
agencies and all people who value and depend on the caribou.55
4. Current conditions
Today, WACHWG—and caribou at the center of it—are facing
challenging times due to factors external to the group. Between
2003 and 2011, the population of the Western Arctic Caribou Herd
declined an average rate of 4–6% annually. As of 2011, the
population of the herd numbered 325,000.56 The caribou were
traditionally used primarily for subsistence, and today around
10,000 to 15,000 caribou each year are killed for that purpose.
Additionally, nonresidents and nonlocals kill approximately 500 to
800 caribou each year in hunting expeditions.57 The New York Times
recently reported that a controversial predator control regime
implemented by the state—killing wolves, with the hope of
increasing the number of caribou—had failed.58
Additional concerns arise due to resource development and
mining expansion westward from Prudhoe Bay into the National
Petroleum Reserve-Alaska. Such continued expansion of mining
would require cutting a transportation corridor through the herd’s
range, which could affect the migration and distribution of the
herd. Additionally, increased tourist aircraft overflight may stress
the caribou before the winter months at a time when they should
be gaining fat reserves.59
Social, cultural, and traditional values are also at risk. Rural
interior communities tend to be quite small and deeply rooted in
traditional practices. Climate change effects and conflict over
natural resources development are rapidly changing traditional
ways of life.60 As elders die, traditional knowledge is lost.61 Rural
communities are struggling to adapt to technological and social
55.
56.
57.
58.

W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., supra note 21, at 2.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 1.
Joanna Klein, Protected Wolves in Alaska Face Peril From Beyond Their Preserve, N.Y.
TIMES (Jul. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/science/wolves-alaskayukon-charley-preserve.html.
59. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., supra note 21, at 5.
60. OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL STRATEGY ON THE
ARCTIC REGION (NSAR)—TEN YEAR RENEWABLE ENERGY STRATEGY 23 (2014) (“Concerns
were expressed about melting permafrost leading to sinking villages and sea level rising.”).
61. Id. at 39.
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change.62 There is no road access to many rural interior villages.63
Residents and government officials must use airplanes, boats, snow
machines, and sled dog teams to travel to more populated areas,
which are hours away. Pilots must fly in the fuel to power these
vital forms of transportation.64
Food security remains a primary concern in rural Alaska.65
Modern inhabitants of rural villages continue to live a subsistence
lifestyle during times of food scarcity, depending upon hunted and
harvested foods for the majority of their diet.66
Against this mix of social, ecological, and economic challenges,
the WACHWG provides a valuable management tool. According
to interviews, village residents feel more positively about agency
officials who participate in the group.67 The structural design that
facilitated that trust, however, is imperfect. Because many group
members have served for many years, there is infrequent
turnover, which reduces the potential for information sharing
through group members returning to their villages to share what
they have learned.
The group also comes at a professional cost to the biologists
who participate because it lessens the time they can spend in the
field. WACHWG founder Jim Dau notes, “We invested tremendous
time and energy to initially establish and later support this group,
and we paid dearly in terms of internal political capital.”68
Nevertheless, the two-decades-long collaboration has built
relationships among previous adversaries and developed longabsent trust between Alaskan Native communities and agency
officials. Decades of relationship-building provide a solid

62. Id. at 41.
63. Interties, roads, and basic infrastructure in villages are ongoing, critical needs in

the region.
64. Id. at 17 (“Another concern was the shallowing of the upper Kobuk rivers, which
requires fuel to be flown in.”).
65. Several quotations are drawn from words spoken directly by members of Alaskan
Native communities. In 2014, The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Indian Energy held
a series of seven tribal consultation sessions in various Alaskan cities. Notably, these were
more populous places, not the smallest villages, although some sent representations to the
sessions. Between two and twenty-two people attended each meeting. Minutes of what
residents said in the meeting highlights some of the concerns. Id. at 2–3.
66. Id. at 37.
67. Dau, supra note 28.
68. Id.
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foundation for decision-making to meet the current risks to the
herd and indigenous residents to rural Alaska.
B. Agencies’ Use of Collaborative Analysis
To manage caribou, WACHWG used a broad group of
stakeholders to fashion an ongoing solution through collaborative
analysis. Indeed, collaborative analysis—the focus of this Article—
stems from these stakeholder collaborations.69 But the working
group in Alaska is not alone in employing this analytical approach.
There are hundreds of stakeholder collaborations governing the
land and natural resources in the United States. 70
Through collaborations, however, stakeholders and agencies
try to avoid litigation and gridlock. Stakeholders commit to
creating mutually agreeable recommendations to the agency on
how best to manage risk. They hash out disagreements, negotiate,
and ultimately compromise. One court noted that “[p]ublic
participation is, by nature, messy.”71 It is a time-consuming, inexact
process filled with ups and downs. The group issues
recommendations and feedback to the agency on an ongoing basis,
which allows the agency to assess prior decisions and update
assessments in light of changing conditions.72

69. Stakeholder collaborations are “a group of people with strong interests in, yet
differing views on, the proper management of a particular, localized group of lands or
resources, committed in writing to working together to create mutually agreeable
recommendations for managing the resource across changing conditions on an ongoing
basis.” Karen Bradshaw, Agency Engagement with Stakeholder Collaborations, in Wildfire Policy
and Beyond, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 437, 445 (2019).
70. As an Academic Consultant for ACUS in 2017, I led a team of research assistants
for three months in meeting with agency employees, touring public lands, and conducting
dozens of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and agency officials. We surveyed
statutes, executive orders, and regulations to assess how many collaborations existed. To
gain a real world perspective on the uses and limitations of democratic risk management, I
traveled to Alaska to observe how agency officials manage to incorporate social and moral
inputs into risk management decisions. The project culminated in an ACUS Office of the
Chairman report, Stakeholder Collaborations for Managing Land and Natural Resources. See
BRADSHAW, supra note 8. That report and a subsequent law journal article overviewed what
collaborations are, who uses them, and in which contexts. Id. (analyzing stakeholder
collaborations through a survey of laws and regulations requiring collaboration, review of
primary documents, and qualitative data gathered through interviews and attendance at
agency meetings); Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 456.
71. W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1313 (D. Idaho 2008).
72. See BRADSHAW, supra note 8.
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Collaborations do not produce clear winners and losers.
Stakeholders generally end up with better outcomes than if they
had not participated, but not their ideal outcome.73 Through such
processes of negotiation, decisions shift from Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency (the group is overall better off than the status quo)74 to
Pareto superior outcomes (some people are better off relative to the
status quo and no one is worse off).75 The group voluntarily
smooths the distributional effects of decisions by re-allocating the
benefits and harms. For example, a wildlife advocacy organization
may agree to compensate ranchers whose livestock are killed by
wolves reintroduced to an area, even though the agency managing
wolves has no legal obligation to compensate ranchers.76
Stakeholder collaborations provide a standing, readily
available cross-section of key constituencies to assess and manage
new and emerging challenges. They also serve to generate bottomup or crowdsourced information about risk, which may include
information absent from the analytic-data approach.77 Temporally,
collaborative decision-making sometimes collapses the assessment
and management phases of risk assessment, removing an arbitrary
distinction that need not exist. Collaborations’ ongoing, iterative
nature differentiates them from other forms of public-private
cooperation, such as linear notice-and-comment periods or
negotiated rulemaking. There is no endpoint to stakeholder
collaborations—no moment at which the stakeholders must decide
on a final policy decision. The focus, objective, and composition of
the group may shift dramatically over time.78

73. SHANNON K. ORR, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING AND STAKEHOLDER
COLLABORATION 54 (2013).
74. MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 21–22 (2006).
75. Id. at 5.
76. ORR, supra note 73, at 136–39.
77. See infra Section II.B.
78. Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level
Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507, 2542–43 (2015) (describing how the Malpai Borderlands
cattle ranching community leverages preexisting relationships formed around grazing
practices to manage wildfire risk).
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Many agencies rely heavily on stakeholder collaborations to
inform risk management policy.79 They credit collaboration with
producing substantively better decisions informed by different
perspectives and a broader information base.80 Instead of agency
officials making value judgments and guesses as to distributional
consequences, they float potential policies past the clearly
identifiable stakeholders who would feel their serious, localized
effects.81 Early and meaningful public engagement leads to greater
social acceptance of decision-making, and potentially less
litigation.82 Agency employees describe working with stakeholder
collaborations as “vital” and note that “we couldn’t do our jobs
without it.”83
Agencies have long operated amidst deep uncertainty. Over
time, they have learned how to make controversial, high-stake
decisions that will prove politically and socially acceptable.
For instance, agencies use a variety of collaborative governance
tools (e.g., regional bodies, listening sessions, notice-and-comment
periods, and informal relationships) that involve some degree
of collaboration.84 Agencies frequently use stakeholder
collaborations—coordinating early and often with the private
groups that will most bear the costs or benefits of agency
decisions—to inform policymaking in conditions of frequent
change, localized high stakes, and deep uncertainty.85 Although
79. Although ubiquitous in practice, discussion of collaborative analysis as an
alternative to top-down approaches is virtually absent from legal scholarship on risk
management. For a discussion of related literatures, see infra Section II.B. Existing risk
management theory posits that agencies use scientific data to set standards, then employs
cost-benefit analysis to assess various policy tools to achieve the standard. This account is
correct but incomplete—it overlooks the vital step of qualitative inputs into the
policymaking practice.
80. See infra Section II.B.
81. See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
82. Department Hearings and Appeals Procedures; Cooperative Relations; Grazing
Administration—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894, 9924 (Feb. 22, 1995) (“Experience
has shown that the greater and more meaningful the participation during the formulation of
decisions and strategies for management, the higher the level of acceptance and thus the
lower the likelihood of a protest, an appeal, or some other form of contest”); see also infra
Section III.C; .
83. Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 442 n.13.
84. For a typology of collaborative techniques, and their features, used in land and
resource management, see BRADSHAW, supra note 8, at 15 fig.1.
85. See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 121, 143-45, 156-57 (2016); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 376-79 (2004).
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many scholars are doing the important work of documenting
agencies’ use of these tools, they have been slow to situate
them next to cost-benefit analysis in the pantheon of decisionmaking tools.
Collaborative analysis is especially relevant for high-stakes
decisions for a small and localized population (i.e., management of
specific public lands or policing practices). It is less sensible either
in circumstances with uniform, diffuse effects without localized
expertise (i.e., vaccine recommendations) or in circumstances with
a need for centralized, top-down, unilateral control (i.e., military
action). Agencies widely studied by administrative law scholars,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency and Office of
Workplace Health and Safety, tend to use cost-benefit analysis
because the scale of policy decisions tracks guidelines for using
cost-benefit analysis. Agencies controlling physical resources with
a set geographic position tend to use collaborative analysis. These
include the Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service,
and Forest Service. Under a collaborative analysis approach, the
agency is constantly assessing and managing risk in consultation
with stakeholders. This real-time feedback mechanism creates
adaptiveness and partnerships unavailable through cost-benefit
analysis alone.
To provide an example of how response can occur prior to
assessment, consider oil spills. Potentially responsible parties (who
spilled the oil) provide funding for natural resources trustees
(tribes, federal agencies, and states) to initiate clean up and
recovery efforts immediately. All parties benefit from early
response, rather than waiting the many years necessary to provide
a cost assessment of risks. But this option is only available when
potentially responsible parties and trustees agree to work jointly on
recovery—a collaborative analysis technique. 86
Agencies’ need to incorporate stakeholder input into policy
analysis is important for sizeable risks, which risks will be
internalized by concentrated, identifiable groups.87 Stakeholder
86. Karen Bradshaw, Settling for Natural Resource Damages, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
211 (2016).
87. Stakeholders are unlikely to engage in collaborations for low-stakes outcomes;
similarly agencies (and even the President) may be loath to share decision-making for
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input can increase agencies’ understanding of how citizens value
various criteria, broaden the perspectives brought to bear on an
issue. Collaborative processes can also generate better data,
increase social acceptance of decisions, overcome group
polarization, facilitate resource pooling, and allow for
continuously updating policy.88 Core principles from disparate
academic literatures foreshadow collaborative analysis by
demonstrating that collaborative approaches have potential to
produce more efficient, just, and cost-effective policymaking. My
research indicates that collaborative analysis enables agencies to
leverage the knowledge and capabilities of stakeholders, engage in
iterative analysis, and pre-test the social acceptability of decisions
prior to implementation.89
Collaborative analysis intersects with cost-benefit analysis in
context-specific ways: sometimes the tools act in tandem,
sometimes one substitutes for the other.90
Although various models of collaborative analysis exist, the
most visible form is of a stakeholder collaboration consulting with
an agency on the decision-making. A stakeholder collaboration is a
group of people with strong interests in, yet differing views on, an
important issue. For example, stakeholder collaborations can form
around the management of a localized group of lands or resources,
between members who are formally committed to working
together to create mutually agreeable recommendations for
managing the resource across changing conditions.91 Landowners,
industrial land users, nongovernmental organizations, state and
tribal neighbors, hunters, conservationists, and others form
collaborations as a structural vehicle for coming together to discuss
issues related to specific lands or resources.92
In such groups, a strong interest in the outcome of the decision
unifies differing parties—essentially, the parties involved in the
collaboration are those who will bear the detriments of
mismanaged risk. Stakeholder collaborations develop rules and
very high-stakes outcomes. Thus, collaborative analysis likely operates best in between
these extremes.
88. See infra Section II.B.
89. Bradshaw, supra note 69.
90. See infra notes 98–103.
91. See BRADSHAW, supra note 8, at 10.
92. Id. at 3.
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norms for internal governance, such as organizing monthly
meetings and determining rules for dispute resolution. Over time,
the collaboration identifies specific areas of concern, shares
perspectives, considers data, creates reports, and hashes out
recommendations on how the relevant management agency should
approach a problem.
Agencies work closely with collaborations but are not
themselves members of the collaboration.93 Instead, agencies play a
supportive role, such as by initiating the formation of a
collaboration, providing meeting space, carrying out studies,
assigning personnel to act as liaisons between the collaboration and
agency, sharing information, and generating funding.94
Importantly, agencies can provide stakeholders with data and
information on how to assess it. Decision-making under this model
is an iterative process, unfolding over decades in response to everchanging natural conditions. Stakeholder collaborations often work
with agencies to achieve multiple objectives and, throughout it all,
strive to build trust and maintain positive, working relationships.
Agencies also informally share a portion of their decisionmaking authority with collaborations when they engage
stakeholders in meetings and working groups to reach mutually
agreeable decisions. The agency is legally required, however, to
retain sole decision-making authority, even when making decisions
in consultation with collaborative groups.95
II. COMPARING COLLABORATIVE ANALYSIS WITH COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
This Part compares and contrasts collaborative analysis
with cost-benefit analysis (as the most familiar placeholder for the

93. One agency respondent raised the important point that this definition excludes
forms of collaboration such as regional planning bodies, in which various government
entities collaborate to explore options and share information. Although such a body would
be outside the definition of stakeholder collaborations as defined in this article since it
includes on government stakeholders, inter-government collaborations undoubtedly exist
among federal, tribal, state, and local governments, and play an important role in managing
a variety of resources.
94. See BRADSHAW, supra note 8, at 4.
95. For a discussion of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and other rules limiting
the extent to which agencies can defer to external groups, see infra notes 160–162 and
accompanying text
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broader category of numerical decision-making tools). I outline the
benefits of collaborative analysis (Section II.A.) and arguments
against it (Section II.B).
A. The Benefits of Collaborative Analysis
1. Incorporating moral inputs
For sixty years, law and economics scholars have struggled to
respond to critiques that cost-benefit analysis alone, without social
or moral context, can lead to perverse outcomes.96 Many focus on
empirical data: better evaluations, more convincing numbers,
weighting factors to reflect moral judgments.97
Traditional accounts of cost-benefit analysis include a variety of
tools to capture people’s values, such as “willingness to pay.”98
Collaborative analysis hands the problem to be managed over to
the people most affected by it. It allows that group to hash out a
mutually acceptable policy, which implicitly represents the
aggregate of their collective preferences weighted to reflect the
relative strength of the individuals within the group. Collaborative
analysis can serve as either a stand-in for cost-benefit analysis, or a
complement to it.
In practice, agencies must incorporate distributional concerns
into policymaking.99 Widespread attention to distributional
weighting as the mechanism through which this can occur fails to
consider the viability of alternative and complementary tools for
incorporating such concerns into decision-making. Indeed,

96. See also Frank Ackerman et al., Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN L. REV. 155, 157 (2005) (describing that
blind application of cost-benefit analysis could lead to questionable decisions). For example,
a strict cost-benefit analysis might encourage people to smoke so they would live less long
and thus require fewer healthcare expenditures.
97. Distributional weighting involves assigning various values into cost-benefit
analysis to reduce income effects, effectively lessening inequality and wealth considerations.
See David A. Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit analysis: Welfare Economics Meets
Organizational Design, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 151–52 (2015) (overviewing the key
arguments in the lively debate about distributional weighting); see also infra Section II.C.
98. “Willingness to pay” describes economists asking people what they are willing to
pay for various goods, then using the input to calculate the compensating variation, or the
amount that the individuals would be willing to pay to start or stop the project. Matthew
Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (1998).
99. A variety of laws, executive orders, and regulations require agencies to incorporate
distributional concerns through qualitative input. See infra Part III.
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collaborative analysis captures the distributional and value
questions that economists have struggled to incorporate into a costbenefit analysis. Agencies may be using collaborative analysis
instead of top-down policymaking in situations where
distributional questions should drive policy outcomes, suggesting
that distributional weighting within cost-benefit analysis may be
relatively unimportant if agencies switch to an alternative tool
when policy requires distributional assessments that drive choices.
There are many reasons to think that direct qualitative input by
stakeholders might better reflect their actual preferences than
attempts to quantify their thoughts through contingent valuation
or other data-driven tools. Some people respond hostilely to
questions posed by economists with clipboards standing in front of
supermarkets, refusing to answer the question or offering
extraordinary high or low values.100 Survey techniques place even
willing participants in an artificial situation, likely thinking of their
drive home or dinner plans and not having an opportunity to
meaningfully consider information about the questions posted for
a meaningful period. Moreover, surveying creates isolation,
focusing only on the individual being asked the question. People
learn about their own values through interaction; the group
dynamics of collaborative analysis allow individuals to refine and
improve their assessments in relation to the perspectives of others.
Making real-world tradeoffs within social, ecological, and
economic realities removes the artificiality of contingent valuation
and other survey methodologies.101 I cannot tell you with certainty
whether I value Mt. Shasta at $100 million or $1 billion or $100
billion. But I could certainly make choices about what I would be
willing to trade to prevent strip mining the dramatic mountain.
Would I trade the total national gross domestic product? No. Some
missed opportunities for growth within the relatively
impoverished local economy? Certainly. Within this spectrum of
these extremes, I could make refined and detailed judgments,
particularly if allowed to consider the issue for an extended time

100. ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE
PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 30–8 (1989).
101. “In day-to-day life, we routinely make judgments of overall well-being, comparing
losses to some of our friends, colleagues or family members with gains to others.” ADLER &
POSNER, supra 74, at 41.
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in collaboration with other committed stakeholders. As a result, the
real-world nature of making tradeoffs that reflect my internal
values is almost certainly more accurate than attempting to
assign dollar values to things that the average person does not
consider quantifiable.
For these reasons, collaborative analysis can serve as a formal
or informal complement to cost-benefit analysis.102 One could
imagine agencies using stakeholder groups to weigh various kinds
of data, then input stakeholder weighting into the cost-benefit
analysis. Matthew Adler and Eric Posner describe the potential for
agencies to “launder” public preferences, removing heuristic biases
and idiosyncratic or antisocial inputs.103 Although Adler and
Posner consider agency officials themselves performing this
function, under the collaborative analysis models, agencies task
stakeholder groups with sorting through various preferences.
2. Facilitating Pareto superior outcomes
Collaborative analysis can shift policy outcomes from satisfying
Kaldor-Hicks criteria (the net welfare is higher) to Pareto
superior decisions (all parties are at least equally well off) by
prompting trades among potential winners and losers. Stakeholder
groups provide a government-sponsored forum for distributional
negotiations, which top-down decision-making cannot achieve
in isolation.
Consider the difference between top-down and democratic
policymaking for a decision between logging a public forest or
conserving it for wildlife preservation. Under a top-down model,
the agency might conduct a cost-benefit analysis. If logging
produced a gain bigger than the costs associated with losing
wildlife habitat, the decision would satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks
criteria, and the agency would permit the logging operation.
Under a collaborative analysis model, a stakeholder group
comprising both the timber company and the environmental
nongovernmental organization would vote on a recommendation
of whether to log or not. To secure the vote of the environmental
NGO, the timber company might agree to place a conservation

102. See id. at 73–79.
103. Id. at 129–49.
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easement on private land to provide wildlife habitat in perpetuity.
If the NGO found this a satisfactory deal, they would vote yes. The
stakeholder group would issue a recommendation that the Forest
Service approve the logging operation, and it would approve the
project. Through the democratic process, the parties will negotiate
until they reach a Pareto superior outcome, in which both parties
are better off than the status quo.
The imprimatur of a government-sponsored forum allows
polarized parties to retain integrity in the eyes of their
constituencies while nevertheless making tradeoffs. Stakeholders
can credibly report to their constituencies that the cost of not
participating in a collaboration is greater than what they might
concede to reach agreement. The threat of unfavorable agency
action absent an agreement drives all parties towards increased
openness to negotiation, relative to direct bargaining. Moreover,
collaboration integrates agency decision-makers into the policy
process, and thus they are more likely to accept the stakeholder
recommendation, relative to parties saying “we have reached a
bargain for you to approve” without agency input. In sum,
collaborative analysis opens the door to direct negotiation for
redistribution of benefits to secure policy approvals.
3. Inclusiveness of diverse perspectives and talents
Cost-benefit analysis uses a language (math) in which relatively
few Americans are fluent. This unintentionally serves to shuts out
all but the highly educated from policy spaces. Scholars who
conflate “sound” decision-making with numerical analysis
discount vast swaths of the human potential. Valuable alternative
data exist. Dogged insistence on numerical analysis as the gold
standard for agency and judicial decision-making threatens to
narrow the array of human potential to a small subset of skills.
Tapping into these diverse sources of information by engaging nonagency actors through the process of democratic risk management
broadens the pool of information to inform policy choices.
Diversity advocates often frame arguments in terms of fairer,
more just policy and the related goal of democratic legitimacy.
Here, I advance a related but distinct basis for a diversity of inputs
into agency decision-making: that incorporating diverse
perspectives in agency decision-making can make substantively
680
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better policy by introducing a broader base of information on which
to base a decision.
Useful talents are distributed inequitably across the population.
So too is genius. Thus, over-emphasizing a category of people in
government fails to capture the collective potential of a population.
Leveraging the collective skills and strengths dispersed throughout
society opens the door to more information and better decisions.104
Recognizing the diffusion of skill may also serve to increase social
cooperation and a more democratic government by acknowledging
that different people bring different traits to the table, the sum of
which is greater than its parts. No one country, social group, or
segment of society has a monopoly on all the relevant, necessary
knowledge in the world
It is easy for those resistant to this argument to jump to logical
extremes, suggesting, for example, the influence of a single
idiosyncratic person or group with questionable “data.” Although
such defensiveness is understandable, it can also be
counterproductive to achieving desired outcomes. Law has long
incorporated roles for nonacademic data to inform policy. And it
should. Here, I take the argument a step farther and explore how
law institutionalizes the input of nonacademic data into regulatory
decisions. As outlined below, the formalized incorporation of data
varies wildly according to its source.
Risk perception literature within social psychology finds
that groups of stakeholders informed by risk experts can generate
the best-available decisions.105 Robin S. Gregory has
conducted decades of experiments on how stakeholder
involvement can influence agency decision-making.106 Gregory’s

104. Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1103 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)). See, e.g., R. GREGORY ET AL., STRUCTURED DECISION
MAKING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT CHOICES (2012)
[hereinafter STRUCTURED DECISION MAKING]; Robin S. Gregory & Ralph L. Keeny, Making
Smarter Environmental Management Decisions, 38 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 1601 (2002)
[hereinafter Environmental Management Decisions]; Robin S. Gregory, The Troubling Logic of
Inclusivity in Environmental Consultations, 42 SCI., TECH,. & HUM. VALUES 144 (2017)
[hereinafter The Troubling Logic].
105. Kahan et al., supra note 104.
106. See, e.g., STRUCTURED DECISION MAKING, supra note 104; Environmental Management
Decisions, supra note 104. A robust social science on risk perception studies the way that
people assess risk. Kahan et al., supra note 104.
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work on “‘science-based, community-supported’ environmental
risk policies . . . presents empirical evidence showing that this
approach generates outcomes that are more consensual and more
defensible from a scientific standpoint than either unguided
bottom-up approaches to regulations or highly centralized and
insulated top-down ones.”107 Similarly, Dan Kahan has pushed
back against the anti-populist elements of Sunstein’s approach by
suggesting that different world views may not reflect heuristic
error so much as value differences.108
Agency employees tend to share ideological commitments,
which may differ from those of the broader public. Introducing
external perspectives increases agency cognition of outside views,
which can broaden agency approaches.109 Stakeholder
collaborations generate different management ideas than the
agency would if acting alone. Competing ideas may lead to extra
vetting, resulting in better decisions.
A member of a stakeholder collaboration described the group’s
influence on the Forest Service’s approach to the NEPA process:
[T]hey have certain criteria for data, that might not be the most
recently available data, but at that agency because of their
litigation, they are more comfortable with certain kinds of data
that they feel has defended protective actions more. I think that is
where the conflict comes. The stakeholders would like to be
innovative and use best available science. The Forest Service
Agency has reluctance to switch data midstream because it hasn’t
been proven in court and might be more vulnerable. We would
argue that using best available science would do better in court.110

107. Kahan et al., supra note 104 (citing Robin Gregory & Katherine Wellman, Bringing
Stakeholder Values into Environmental Policy Choices: A Community-Based Estuary Case Study, 39
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 37–38 (2001)). Interestingly, Gregory has recently suggested that
too much unfiltered stakeholder input can also be counterproductive—a reminder
that collaborative analysis is not a panacea against poor decisions. The Troubling Logic, supra
note 104.
108. Kahan et al., supra note 104, at 1072 (describing a theory of cultural cognition,
which suggests that individuals conform their beliefs about risk to their visions of an
ideal society).
109. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 87 (1992) (noting that “cooperative open communication may
produce more efficient regulatory outcomes because bad arguments and bad solutions are
less likely to go unchallenged”).
110. Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 479.
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This example illustrates a collaboration pushing an agency towards
what may, in fact, be an objectively better decision—using the best
available science, instead of the more defensive position (i.e., what
a court has previously accepted). Ultimately, the collaboration
pushed the agency to adopt better quantitative analysis techniques.
Agencies’ willingness to share decision-making builds
relationships and improves the agencies’ reputations, which is
useful for managing other agency affairs.
4. Generating better data
Stakeholder input increases the likelihood of generating
valuable information that might otherwise be unavailable to
agencies, which often rely solely on scientifically generated data.111
Alternative data may include the observations of on-the-ground
users of a resource that possess a degree of specialization that
outsiders cannot replicate. Consider a few examples: An
experienced factory worker could discern how well a machine she
maintains is operating by the humming sound it makes.112 Sailors
in the Marshall Island maintained a sophisticated tidal map in their
minds that allowed them to navigate great distances without
Western navigation tools, a feat so complicated that scientists had
to see it to believe it.113 Villagers in Aneyoshi, Japan, escaped a
tsunami by heeding century-old carved stone tablets that warned
future generations to escape to higher ground when waves reached
a certain level.114
These examples illustrate insights can produce information that
would be valuable in assessing risk of machine failure, safe sailing
conditions, and tsunami evacuation planning. Failure to
incorporate institutional or traditional knowledge by these
stakeholders would lead to suboptimal decision-making.

111. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 174 (2014)
(noting the value of private entities providing information unavailable to agencies acting
in isolation).
112. Michael Barbaro, Listen to ‘The Daily’: Disappearing Factory Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/podcasts/the-daily/factory-jobs.html.
113. Kim Tingley, The Secrets of the Wave Pilots, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/magazine/the-secrets-of-the-wave-pilots.html.
114. Danny Lewis, These Century-Old Stone “Tsunami Stones” Dot Japan’s Coastline,
SMITHSONIAN.COM (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/
century-old-warnings-against-tsunamis-dot-japans-coastline-180956448/.
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Collaborative analysis provides a forum for agencies to receive and
incorporate such pluralistic forms of information.
Various academic literatures provide examples of alternative
data that adds real value to risk management and policymaking.
The Nobel Prize-winning work of Elinor Ostrom observed that
bottom-up rules developed by non-expert resource users
outperformed top-down policies informed by scientific
information in many natural resource contexts.115 The related social
ecological systems theory suggests that ecosystems, local knowledge,
people, and property rights institutions are inexorably linked—
suggesting that risk approaches failing to incorporate these
elements are foregoing valuable information.116
Similarly, firms operating within an industry tend to have
superior information about that industry, relative to regulators.117
Jody Freeman has shown how regulators collaborate with
regulated entities through negotiated rulemaking.118 Similarly, a
robust literature on public-private partnership and new governance
documents agencies’ willingness to partner with regulated entities,
and the benefits of doing so.119
Social justice scholars suggest that empowering diverse peoples
in decision-making produces policy that is more just and fair.
Traditional ecological knowledge—intergenerational information
about the natural environment contained in the oral history of
indigenous peoples—is increasingly recognized as a legally valid

115. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). This influential finding has led subsequent
scholars to conduct thousands of case studies examining user-created rules to manage risks
ranging from poaching to deforestation. See generally CPR & SES Databases, INDIANA
UNIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON: OSTROM WORKSHOP, https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/
resources/library/cpr-ses-databases.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
116. FIKRET BERKES & CARL FOLKE, LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS:
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE 2 (1998).
117. Id.
118. See JODY FREEMAN & MARTHA MINOW, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000).
119. See, e.g., Orley Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012); Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New
Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515, 2515 (2013).
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decision-making tool.120 Mary Becker’s theory of relational feminism
suggests that culture overvalues masculine qualities and
undervalues female qualities, such as community and
relationships.121 Similarly, ecofeminism suggests that environmental
policy can only be adequately addressed through increased
inclusion of intersectional, traditionally oppressed voices.122
Inclusion of less-represented groups may prove more efficient too:
recent studies suggest that the impoverished are best-positioned to
assess the effectiveness of funds deployed to alleviate poverty.123
Tapping into these diverse sources of information by engaging
non-agency actors through the process of collaborative analysis
broadens the pool of information to inform policy choices.
Stakeholder groups provide a structured, ongoing, and transparent
form of information gathering. They also provide insight into how
to frame policies in a manner that will appeal to as many
constituencies as possible.
5. Increasing social acceptance
Agency officials believe that decisions they make through
collaborative processes benefit from greater social acceptance.124
Collaborations generally form around controversial issues with
deeply entrenched interest groups. Within this adversarial context,
decisions informed by collaboration may prove more socially
acceptable than those made by agency officials acting alone.
Through collaboration, stakeholders negotiate compromises
themselves, instead of merely receiving and judging agency
120. Katie O’Bryan, The Appropriation of Indigenous Ecological Knowledge: Recent
Australian Developments, 1 MACQUARIE J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 29, 44-45 (2004). Some
commentators view traditional ecological knowledge as valuable in bolstering community
resilience to climate change. Erik Gómez-Baggethun et al., Traditional Ecological Knowledge
and Global Environmental Change: Research Findings and Policy Implications, 18 ECOLOGY &
SOC’Y 72 (2013).
121. Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 21, 47–49 (1999).
122. Greta Gaard & Lori Gruen, Ecofeminism: Toward Global Justice and Planetary Health,
2 SOC’Y & NATURE 1 (1993); VANDANA SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND
DEVELOPMENT 44-46 (1988).
123. Johannes Haushofer & Jeremy Shapiro, The Short-term Impact of Unconditional Cash
Transfers to the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya, 131 Q. J. ECON. 1973 (2016).
124. Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 479–80; AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 109, at 87–
88 (“Conditions of trust and cooperation increase the prospects that the parties will end up
with a commitment to making the agreed solution work”).
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decisions. In this sense, an agency official described collaborations
as “do[ing] our work for us” by building social consensus around
controversial decisions.125
On a related point, agencies believe they are less likely to be
sued, or to lose a lawsuit, for a decision that accords with a set of
recommendations from a stakeholder collaboration. One official
noted: “Collaboration is not the panacea for getting rid of lawsuits.
But it sure as hell makes [that risk] a lot lower.”126 Lessened
litigation risk is partially explainable by the positive relationships
that emerge in groups, and the expectation that the group—and
relationships between its members—will persist in the future. Also,
entrenched interests necessarily accept up-front that compromise
is the expected outcome of collaboration. Potential litigants may
believe that their negotiated decisions are less risky than what
a court might provide, a calculus like that which occurs
in settlements.
Finally, constituencies may bristle at top-down government
decisions for a variety of reasons. An official reported: “I don’t
think anybody can do anything on their own anymore and be
legitimate.”127 This point is consistent with the theory of
deliberative democracy—the idea that citizens and government
representatives alike should give reasons for the decisions that they
reach, using some mix of procedural and substantive information
to justify policies.128 Collaboration on sensitive decisions appears to
have become the new norm.
6. Overcoming group polarization
The possibility-opening nature of collaborative analysis may
overcome some of the very biases that behavioral economists use
to justify top-down policy solutions.129 Behavioral economists
observe that group polarization is a virtually inevitable function of
belonging to a group.130 Creating a new stakeholder group may

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Interview 4 (on file with author).
Id.
Id.
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004).
See infra Section II.B.
Kahan et al., supra note 104, at 1085; Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization,
10 J. POL. PHIL. 175 (2002).
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avoid this outcome by providing an opportunity for people with
entrenched viewpoints to form a new identity as a member of a
collaborative group committed to compromise. Social scientists
have predicted this result, noting:
[C]ultural affinity is the dominant in-group when individuals
appraise risk. But as they engage one another in earnest face-toface deliberation, individuals committed to resolving an
important common problem typically form strong emotional
bonds. It’s plausible to imagine that these connections generate
a group identity that, for the period of deliberation at
least, displaces cultural affiliations as individuals’ dominant
reference point.131

Precisely such a dynamic appears to have occurred within the
successful collaborations that I studied.132 Relationships defined by
deep-seated distrust transformed through ongoing participation
in the group. Although previous opponents are not aligned,
strong relationships have emerged, which serve to humanize
opposing perspectives. Moreover, the creation of a shared group
seemingly lessened the need for participants to cling to their
positions. It became socially acceptable to compromise and see
differing perspectives.
Of course, the mere creation of relationships in well-functioning
groups does not indicate that all groups will be successful. Agency
officials provided examples of decades-long collaborations
marked by entrenched positions and in-fighting with few
tangible successes.133 The key trademarks of unsuccessful groups
included: personality conflicts, distrust, and an unwillingness
to compromise.
Trust is the well-acknowledged linchpin of successful
groups.134 But how does it emerge? Three factors repeatedly came
up in interviews with agency officials that seem particularly likely

131. Kahan et al., supra note 104, at 1101–02.
132. See Bradshaw, supra note 70; infra Part I.
133. Although the agency officials declined to permit the details of these failures to be

published, it is important to note that failures exist, if only to flag the need for further study
of what breeds, or prevents, group polarization.
134. For a discussion on the role of trust in collaborative regulatory decision-making,
see AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 109, at 84–86; Keith G. Provan & Patrick Kenis, Modes
of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 229, 237–38 (2007).
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to indicate success. First, several groups attribute their success
to professional facilitation by a skilled expert in group dynamics.135
Similarly, some agencies have dedicated experts in
stakeholder collaborations available to agency staff engaging in
collaborative analysis.136
Second, some groups have preexisting shared social norms
among group members or agency members, based upon kinship
relationships, geographic proximity, or prior cooperative
endeavors.137 Note that lower-level state (not federal) officials
formed the WACHWG. The social relationships between these
rural state government officials and the key stakeholders led to a
more inclusive and collaborative approach than approaches
created by top state and federal officials. Shared norms may
provide preexisting understandings of acceptable behavior and
dispute resolution, as well as deepen the parties’ investment in the
success of the group, with anticipated spillover effects into other
aspects of their relationships.138
Third, I suspect that relational contracting is playing an unsung
role in trust-building. Creating early-stage internal rules, group
charters, and memoranda of understanding with the agencies may
satisfy the scaffolding functions that are known to build trust
among commercial contracting parties.139
For example, the WACHWG organizers focused on addressing
small issues at first to build trust, rather than risk fracturing the
budding group by taking on sensitive issues initially. For the first
five years, the WACHWG avoided addressing herd management
issues altogether to avoid “rocking the boat.”140 Instead, the focus
was on facilitating an environment in which the group could build

135. Bradshaw, supra note 8, at 51–52.
136. Id. at 25.
137. Schulz & Lueck, supra note 78, at 2542 (describing how the Malpai Borderlands

cattle ranching community successfully leverages preexisting relationships to manage
wildfire risk). Several founding members of the Western Arctic Caribou Herd Working
Group had familial relationships with members of Alaskan Native communities, which
facilitated trust that would likely have been otherwise unavailable to agency officials.
138. This is my generalized observation resulting from dozens of interviews in various
settings and cultural contexts; it is not a sentiment stated by a particular interview subject.
139. Karen Bradshaw, Agency Coordination of Private Action: The Role of Relational
Contracting, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 229, 229 (2018) (symposium article discussing the role of
relational contracting in public-private collaborations).
140. Dau interview, supra note 28.

688

001.BRADSHAW_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

655

3/25/20 9:02 PM

Stakeholder Collaboration

trust and find a “grudging” consensus over time. The caribou herd
was large and growing during this period, so there was no real
controversial management issue requiring WACHWG’s attention.
Although anecdotal, the factors of external involvement,
shared norms, and relational contracting appear to be some factors
that may increase chances of trust—and thus success—among
group members.
7. Enabling resource pooling
Stakeholders in collaborations use their relative strengths to
advance shared objectives. Agencies and stakeholders are both
confined in what they can do. By pooling capacities, the group can
jointly achieve more than any individual stakeholder could achieve
alone. Collaborative analysis allows for public-private pooling
analogous to agencies pooling with other agencies within the
executive branch.141 For example, stakeholders cannot directly
manage public lands, and agencies cannot lobby Congress. Yet,
working collectively, stakeholders and agencies can develop
common goals, then deploy their relative strengths to advance the
objectives.142 For stakeholders in collaborations, these strengths
often include financial resources, human resources, and the
capacity to lobby.
This synergistic relationship displaces the traditional notion of
agency and non-agency actors acting under the principal-agent
model, in which agencies are essentially controlling external
parties.143 Instead, agencies both support—and are supported by—
stakeholders; agencies influence stakeholder groups and
stakeholder groups influence agencies. Ultimately, agency and
non-agency actors with different capacities and constraints use
collaborations as a starting point to pool resources to advance
shared objectives. The extent of this pooling may, however, raise
questions about the distinctions between public and private

141. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 211 (2015) (describing
agency to agency pooling).
142. Bradshaw, supra note 139.
143. Hannah Wiseman has observed elsewhere in the administrative state that the
relationships now seem bi-directional. Hannah J. Wiseman, Delegation and Dysfunction, 35
YALE J. ON REG. 233, 233 (2018).
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entities, and the degree to which law does—and should—preserve
such distinctions.144
8. Creating responsive policies
Collaborative groups operate as a self-updating system that can
continuously adapt to new information and changed conditions.
In 1992, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite introduced responsive
regulation, in which regulated entities and private interests
cooperate with regulators to create and enforce standards.145
Agencies must continuously respond to emerging social,
economic, and ecological information—having an established
stakeholder group to consult in response to that information is
valuable. Collaborative analysis is uniquely suited to responsive
policymaking. A pre-existing group with established rules and
relationships is always on-call for responding to new and updated
information. Group members influenced by different information
flows can pool data to predict trends or future events. Moreover,
the group members may themselves generate or observe new
information to allow timelier policymaking.
Collaborative analysis also serves as a component of what
Robin Kundis Craig and J.B. Rhul describe as adaptive
management: an iterative decision-making process, in which
people learn from experience and incorporate new information to
create a flexible management plan amidst changing conditions.146
They note that collaborative adaptive management is present in
medical device safety regulation, financial regulation, natural
resource management, and social welfare systems.147 These
observations suggest that there may be many realms within the

144. Although 4FRI lobbies Congress, an interviewee from another agency noted that
“we are pretty careful not to encourage stakeholders to lobby Congress” and suggested that
lobbying is “rare” and resisted the implication “that Federal agencies work with NGOs to
lobby Congress on our behalf.” E-mail from Interviewee 6 to author (on file with author).
145. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 109; Parker, supra note 9, at 2, 7 (describing
Ayres and Braithwaite’s book as “canonical,” but noting that, despite their reliance on law
and economic justifications for responsive regulation, the field of law and economics had not
engaged deeply with their ideas).
146. Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26 (2014); see also Kirk Emerson et al., An Integrative
Framework for Collaborative Governance, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 2 (2011) (describing
collaborative governance, which is similar to adaptive management).
147. Craig & Rhul, supra note 146, at 1.
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administrative state in which collaborative analysis can contribute
to policymaking.
B. Considering Counterarguments
Along with its benefits, collaborative analysis is not without
critiques. In this section, I address head-on the arguments of
collaborative analysis critics, namely that a group is prone to:
irrational cognitive distortions, agency capture by interest groups,
lack of participation by lesser-advantaged stakeholders, and
substantively worse decisions.
Evidence from the social sciences suggests that scholarly
concerns about the irrationality of individuals assessing evidence
may be overstated. I suspect that environmental justice concerns
and agency capitulation to interest groups will occur under any
decision technique. The question, then, is not whether risk
management could lead to poor decisions—it surely could. The
relevant question is whether it can sometimes lead to better decisions
than reliance on isolated agency decision-making informed by
analytic data; I answer this question with a resounding yes.
1. Irrational cognitive distortions
Behavioral economics is widely used to justify agencies’ need
for cost-benefit analysis148 and perhaps provides the most
persuasive argument against collaborative analysis. Richard Thaler
and Cass Sunstein draw upon behavioral economics to suggest that
average people do poorly when making rational decisions about
complex risks.149 Framed in terms of the earlier assessment of risk
management,150 their position might suggest that the human brain
evolved to gauge the risk of a lion attack, but cannot fathom the

148. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008).
149. Id. at 137 (“People often make poor choices.”); Sunstein, supra note 18, at 354
(“Human beings have a great deal of difficulty in assessing risks, making them prone to both
hysteria and neglect . . . .”); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 62 (1995) (“Where differences stem from cognitive errors, such as
the availability heuristic, policymakers can properly exert leadership and not defer to
lay assessments.”). Dan Kahan questioned the theoretical underpinnings, noting that
empirical findings on risk perception in the social sciences contradict the anti-populist
aspects of Sunstein’s account. Kahan et al., supra note 104, at 1104.
150. See supra Part I.
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likely effects of an invisible, global problem. Sunstein advocates for
agencies to use cost-benefit analysis to analyze and set policy.151
Courts should support this, Sunstein argues, by deferring to “the
purely factual judgments of scientific experts” (i.e., agencies) to
avoid hysterical responses by the broader public.152
One can imagine the argument that groups, like individuals, are
subject to a variety of biases that can produce bad decisions. Indeed,
groups may be even worse—members might reinforce each other’s
irrational choices.153 If we accept this as true, then the question
emerges: why are agencies, essentially a group of policymakers, not
themselves subject to such biases? Of course, they are. But, the
argument goes, agencies are subject to oversight, whereas private
groups are not, and officials may reduce the potential for errors
through awareness of them.154 Advocates for agency-determined
policies focus on the good outcomes that top-down, data-driven
regulations have achieved.155
My response begins with questioning the claim that private
groups are inherently suspect, and agencies are somehow a
panacea against lousy decision-making. Critics of cost-benefit
analysis note that there are several instances when agencies made
the wrong call concerning risk or would have if using data-driven

151. Others have argued against widespread adoption of cost-benefit analysis on
practical and moral grounds. Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling mount the primary
critique of the cost-benefit approach. In a multi-pronged attack, they argue that the tool is at
once amoral and leads to poor decisions. They argue instead for adoption of the
Precautionary Principle of avoiding potentially harmful approaches. See generally FRANK
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND
THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004).
152. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683, 737, 739 (1999) (“[A] properly functioning government committed to people’s
well-being will not respond mechanically to expressions of anxiety.”); see also Pildes &
Sunstein, supra note 149, at 52 (noting that “CBA and comparative risk assessment . . . often
appear to be the most promising means” of making sure that “social resources are devoted
to the most serious problems”). When public opinion pushes agencies towards decisions not
indicated by cost-benefit analysis, Sunstein suggests that agencies should “bow to some
degree of such concerns while nevertheless overriding them when possible.” SUNSTEIN, supra
note 111.
153. For a discussion of group polarization, see Sunstein, supra note 130; cf. Kahan et
al., supra note 104, at 1103.
154. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 65–127
(2005) (noting that agency experts are better-positioned to avoid the errors that distort the
risk assessments of the broader citizenry).
155. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 74, at 129–32 (listing decision-making biases).
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analysis.156 Agency decisions leading to population collapse of a
caribou herd, causing Alaskan Natives to die of starvation, provide
a compelling reminder that agency officials can make good and bad
decisions when employing any decision tool. Such reliance on
anecdote questions the soundness of the premise. Having flagged
this point, I set it aside and turn to the broader point.
The argument that the agency action in isolation is the best
choice presumes a reality that does not exist, namely that agencies
can make decisions isolated from public reaction. Disaggregating
agency policymaking into staggered steps of assessment,
management, and implementation creates a distortion whereby
scholars pretend that agencies can make decisions in a vacuum and
can put forward pure data-based assessments immune from
public or industry response. Yet, agencies must deal with the public
at some point. The question, then, is really when and how the
agency chooses to engage with the public. There are essentially
three options:
First, the agency can decide in isolation and try to sneak or
shove its decision through without public approval. This
approach rolls the dice on potential litigation. If the decision is not
detected, perhaps it will not be disputed. But, if agencies make
important decisions with inadequate public input, the backlash can
prove intense.
Second, the agency can make a management decision based on
risk assessment data, then try to garner public support or withstand
public controversy before codifying its decision. This is the model
implicitly envisioned by the analytic-data approach. This approach
can incur substantial implementation delays if stakeholders object
to either the assessment or the management decision. Stakeholders
can litigate or force an agency to go back to the drawing board to
incorporate unaddressed concerns.
Third, under the collaborative approach, an agency identifies a
problem, then works with stakeholders to determine what data is
needed, gathers the data, and asks the collaboration for
recommendations that account for the social, economic, and
ecological criteria. Public concerns are embedded in the decisionmaking process early, and, as a result, agencies can focus some

156. Ackerman et al., supra note 96, at 156.
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degree of data towards addressing the concerns at the assessment
stage. Agencies still, clearly and definitively, exercise final decisionmaking authority over the policy—they cannot give that away.
Cass Sunstein acknowledges that agencies sometimes cannot
reach the policy outcome that the data would argue is the “right”
one because public input derails the agency from selecting the
appropriate result. Given that this critique could apply to all three
decision-making approaches, the question is not whether to engage
the public, but rather how and when. Under any scenario, then,
agencies must interface with the very public that behavioral
economists distrust. They can do so under an adversarial, defensive
posture under the first alternative; from a somewhat more open but
still top-down approach in the second example; or from the
basis that they are in a shared decision space that depends upon
early incorporation of, although not necessarily acquiescence to,
public opinion.
2. Capture
One critique of collaboration is that it is, in fact, legally
sanctioned agency capture. Agency capture occurs when agencies
look primarily to one interest group to provide inputs into the
regulatory process to the exclusion of other interest groups.157 For
collaborative analysis, the specific concern is that an agency would
make a second-best policy decision to maintain good relationships
with the stakeholder collaboration.158 Even if this is true, it is not
necessarily undesirable. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite provide
a game-theoretic model of capture showing that some degree
of agency capture, particularly in response to group decisionmaking, can be beneficial.159 Moreover, an agency can change
course without additional procedures if it discovers that it made
the wrong choice.

157. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006).
158. In one incident, a scientist approached an agency official to complain that a
decision was clearly against scientific evidence that supported an alternate approach. “I
know,” the agency official conceded, “but I have to keep the ranchers happy.” Interview on
file with author.
159. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 109, at 55–81.
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The more troubling capture concern is that an agency might
favor a particular interest group, rather than the stakeholder group
collectively. Some environmental groups suggest that stakeholder
participation is a way for agencies to maintain the appearance of a
neutral process while giving industrial interests what they want.
To some extent, Congress has addressed this concern by
passing the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). As
explained in the companion to this Article, FACA
outlines how federal agencies may partner with citizens and
private entities. FACA applies when agencies coordinate with an
organized, cohesive group of non-agency actors—long-term
consultants, nongovernmental organizations, companies, or
industry groups—for input on agency policies and decisions. It
does not apply to government-to-government coordination, as
when a federal agency works with tribal, state, or local
governments. The applicability of FACA is governed by a few
court decisions, which collectively suggest that if the agency
convenes or controls an ongoing group with a limited
membership that produces consensus and recommendations,
then it must seek FACA certification. At the time of this writing,
over 1,000 FACA certified collaborations exist.
Congress enacted FACA before alternative dispute resolution
and collaborative government became widely popular, according
to some agencies. As a result, some officials view the statute as
out-of-step with modern imperatives to collaborate. FACA
certification can take years to complete, a fact that can serve as a
major impediment to the formation of a new group. Indeed,
agencies actively counsel employees on how to construct
stakeholder groups that do not trigger the need for FACA
certification. The danger of avoiding FACA certification is that
agency decisions made in consultation with non-certified
stakeholder collaborations may run afoul of the non-delegation
doctrine, which limits agencies’ ability to share decision-making
authority provided by Congress.160

A variety of doctrines, statutes, and case holdings require
agencies to retain final decision-making authority over
management decisions, even when working with collaborations.161

160. Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 456–58 (internal citations omitted).
161. Id. at 444.
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Yet, agencies must share decision-making space to some degree to
motivate stakeholders to participate in a collaboration. For
example, leaders in two Alaskan Native communities refused to
participate in the WACHWG collaboration when it became clear
that the Alaska Department of Fish and Game would not share its
decision-making authority. If stakeholders do not believe that an
agency will implement the collaboration’s recommendation, they
have minimal incentive to continue collaborating.
In requiring agencies to both engage with stakeholders and
retain sole final decision-making authority, Congress has created a
problematic situation. Readers should not misunderstand this
observation as a call for Congress to relax agencies’ decisionmaking authority over public land and resources. The nondelegation doctrine and related laws exist for numerous reasons,
including to ensure that agencies manage resources in the public
trust—for the collective benefit of all citizens.162 And stakeholder
collaborations tend to be local. Agency accountability to both the
local stakeholder collaborations and the political influence of the
executive branch therefore provides a check on localized power
over resources. This point underscores, however, the challenges
agencies face in retaining sole decision-making authority while
motivating stakeholders.
To navigate this balance, agencies seem to be paying lip service
to retaining sole decision-making authority while actually sharing
some portion of decision space. The 4FRI collaboration case study
that I presented in another recent article illustrates this point: the
defining narrative of the group centers on the objection process for
the first Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in which the
collaboration participated.163 The Forest Service Regional Forester
handled the objection process by referencing the group decisionmaking process when evaluating the objections of a non-groupmember, WildEarth Guardians. This suggests a special status for
collaborations not available to the public. The 4FRI stakeholders felt
validated when the agencies’ official decision-making essentially
rubberstamped the collaboration’s recommendation. The agency’s
support of the collaboration’s consideration—even in a space in
162. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 1–21 (1993).
163. Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 472.
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which the agency ostensibly had sole authority—illustrates the fine
line agency officials must walk.
Stakeholders participate in collaborations because they have a
significant financial or cultural interest in the land and resources at
stake.164 Stakeholders are highly motivated to participate when
they believe that they can protect and advance their interests
through participating in a collaboration. The less likely the agency
is to follow the recommendation of the collaboration, the less
motivated stakeholders will become to collaborate. If the
stakeholders are sufficiently reflective of the interests at play,
capture concerns in this process will neutralize as the collaboration
must reach mutually acceptable outcomes among opposed parties.
Juidical review is another factor mitigating the capture concern.
Courts are expert in evaluating procedural fairness. And they have
repeatedly shown a willingness to evaluate the procedural fairness
of public participation rather than accepting the mere existence of
some collaboration as per se evidence of inclusion. In Western
Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink,165 a federal district court
reviewed the Bureau of Land Management’s revisions to
regulations regarding public input on cattle grazing on public land.
Rules promulgated in 1995 “gave extensive consideration to
public participation in rangeland management.”166 In response,
industry group National Cattlemen’s Beef Association proposed
revisions, including limits to public participation in day-to-day
grazing matters.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) adopted these
suggestions and published proposed rules changing the public
participation process in two ways. First, it redefined the “interested
public” that would receive notifications of BLM decisions, noting
that the agency planned to drop from the notification list any group
that did not comment on every decision.167 This created a
burdensome requirement that stakeholders provide hundreds of
comments a year on matters of varying importance to receive

164. This accords with general economic understanding that people with diffuse
interests will not invest in protecting their interests. See generally MANCUR OLSON JR, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
165. W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (D. Idaho 2008).
166. Id. at 1306.
167. Id. at 1309.
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information. Second, the new rule limited BLM’s duty to “consult,
cooperate, and coordinate (CCC) with the interested public” on
permitting decisions.168 It exempted several categories of decisionmaking from the CCC requirements.
The BLM justified these limitations to public participation citing
that it incurred “substantial expenses” mailing notices to the
public.169 It also noted that “in-depth public involvement can delay
routine management responses . . . . Cooperation with permittees
and lessees [cattle ranchers], on the other hand, usually results in
more expeditious steps to address resource conditions and can help
avoid lengthy administrative appeals.”170 An interdisciplinary
team of experts reviewed these planned changes and found that
limiting public input would likely worsen land management
decisions and cause environmental harm. The report concluded
that broadened public participation was desirable. Despite this,
BLM published a notice in the Federal Register to adopt the new
rules. An estimated 5000 public comments opposed the new rules
during the notice-and-comment period. The BLM finalized the
rules, despite these objections. A nongovernmental organization
sued, arguing that the decision violated multiple federal statutes.171
The federal district court found that limiting public
participation and CCC duties limited the ability of the public to
assess policy decisions.172 It noted that “the changes substantially
affect both the amount and quality of public input” and would
“freeze the public out” from some decisions.173 The court held that
the revisions facially violated mandatory provisions in the Federal
Land Policy Management Act requiring public input.174 In dicta, the
court also suggested that such limitations on public input violated
NEPA requirements for public participation.175 Notably, this case
emerged from Idaho, a Western state with strong cattle ranching
interests. It indicates a high degree of judicial willingness to

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
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scrutinize agency action to respond to one set of stakeholders while
excluding another.
Even assuming that we accept concerns of capture, I remain
unconvinced that this differentiates collaborative analysis from
other forms of agency decision-making. As early as 1965, economist
Myrick Freeman noted that “such noneconomic factors as the porkbarrel, logrolling, and empire building play an important role” in
outcomes reached by cost-benefit analysis.176 More recently,
Professor Sidney Shapiro has offered a scathing account of how
presidential administrations can politicize risk assessment.177
Shapiro notes that many choices are discretionary, and
discretionary choices at the assessment phase can lead to different
management decisions.178 In one example, industry undertakes the
risk assessment independently. It then provides the results to the
agency, despite concerns that the industrial actors have strong
incentives to craft research that advances their interests.179
The case Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel180 serves as a reminder of
how an agency can go to great lengths to gather high-quality data,
then ignore it for political reasons. In Hodel, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service decided not to list the Northern Spotted Owl as a
threatened species, despite a consensus among biologists that
doing so was scientifically indicated.181 A federal district court held
that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and
remanded the decision to the agency. The issue became so
politicized that President Clinton held a listening session with
stakeholders in the Pacific Northwest on the issue during his first
month in office. This example of the Spotted Owl suggests that
when public stakes are high enough, the decision will be shifted out
of agency hands and escalated to the President.182
The central concern about collaborative analysis should be
exclusion rather than capture. For the reasons outlined above,
176. A. Myrick Freeman, III, Six Federal Reclamation Projects and the Distribution of
Income, 3 WATER RESOURCES RES. 319, 331 (1967) (studying six cost-benefit analyses for
Bureau of Reclamation process and finding the results reflective of political influence); cf.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 154155, at 162 (stating that cost-benefit analysis avoids agency capture).
177. Shapiro, supra note 19.
178. Id. at 1089–90.
179. Id. at 1097–98.
180. N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
181. Id.
182. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2297–98.
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judicial intervention will do much to avoid agencies using
collaborations to benefit one group unfairly. Strong interest groups
excluded from decision-making can use litigation or lobbying to
advocate for their view. But this relies upon access to resources;
some stakeholders are better positioned to participate in
collaborations because they have the time and money to attend.
This is true even when other, less well-off stakeholders have a keen
interest in the outcome of a decision.
3. Inclusiveness
Which stakeholders get a seat at the table? Inclusiveness is a
central concern of collaborative analysis. If agencies are
incorporating the input of stakeholders representing diverse
interests without leaving anyone out, there are many reasons to feel
optimistic about the process. But if some genuinely interested
voices do not find their way into the collaborative analysis, that
is problematic.
Although an agency might sometimes explicitly and knowingly
invite some stakeholder perspectives while limiting others, such
overt action is clear to a court and the public.183 The more insidious
issue of exclusion occurs when an agency offers many stakeholders
the opportunity to participate in an ostensibly neutral way, but
external circumstances preclude involvement from stakeholders
with a deep interest. Such a lack of participation is unlikely to rise
to the level of judicial notice, as the stakeholders who might raise
the issues lack the resources to do so.
Environmental justice theory describes some stakeholders as
repeatedly disadvantaged because of their race, lower socioeconomic-status, less education, age, gender, or rural living
conditions, which make them less able to influence government
decisions.184 President Clinton issued an executive order requiring
agencies to analyze the effect of their decisions on historically
disadvantaged groups.185 But these legal and moral requirements

183. But see W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (D. Idaho
2008) (partially overturned on other grounds).
184. KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETTE, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CREATING EQUALITY,
RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY 6–8 (2002).
185. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
note (2018).
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alone cannot overcome practical realities. For collaborative
analysis, environmental justice concerns suggest that
commentators should focus on including stakeholders who lack the
resources necessary to participate but have an interest in the
resources at stake.
Consider the example of the environmental justice issues
incumbent in the WACHWG case study. Earlier, the case study
reported that several tribal representatives from Alaskan
communities have flown to Anchorage several times a year, for
decades, to participate in the collaborations. In this Section, I situate
the representatives’ ongoing involvement against the social,
geographic, and economic hardship in their lives. The point that
emerges is that the people most imperiled by failed risk
management may face the highest marginal cost of participating in
a collaboration to manage that policy. I sketch the details of this
dilemma below.
Contrast the difficulties borne by the representatives of the
Alaskan Native communities to those of other stakeholders in the
Western Arctic Caribou Herd. Agency officials, representatives of
extractive industries, state and local government officials, and
employees of environmental nongovernmental organizations are
all receiving their wages for attending meetings—it is part of their
jobs. This allows these stakeholders to engage in careful, dataintensive decision-making. But it can serve as a functional bar
against the perspectives of stakeholders whose time and expenses
are not well funded.186
Stakeholders with lower incomes but strong interests in the
land and resources at issue may be displaced by stakeholder
collaborations, relative to less-intensive public participation
processes, such as notice-and-comment periods.187 Collaboration
disadvantages interested stakeholders with insufficient resources
to express that interest through attending meetings, relative to

186. ORR, supra note 73.
187. For example, the annual Western Arctic Caribou Herd Working Group

(WACHWG) meetings take place over two to three days in a location that is several flights
away from villages in which caribou are a primary food source. The 4FRI meetings take place
midmorning on weekdays. Hourly workers or stay-at-home parents might find either
meeting difficult to attend, which contributes to the likelihood that only well-funded
stakeholder collaborations, such as industrial interests and nongovernmental organizations,
will be able to afford to send representatives.
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attending a one-time listening session, or participating in public
comment periods.
One response to this concern may be that sufficiently motivated
stakeholders will pool resources to fund representation in
collaborations. This may be true for certain interests, as with
sportsmen groups who have organized to quite effectively
represent hunting and fishing interests. It is also true for
representatives from Alaskan Native communities, whose deep
reliance on caribou have driven long-term involvement in the
collaboration in which communities pool resources to send
representatives. But this optimistic account fails to take into
account the social and economic costs borne by rural populations
who cannot afford to participate but also cannot afford not to.
Although this discussion focuses on Alaskan Native
communities, the issue of involving all stakeholders in
collaborations is a national issue.188
Having detailed these concerns, I now situate them relative to
other alternatives. Despite the practical difficulty, a core tenet of
collaborative analysis is giving voice to groups who are unable to
participate in cost-benefit analysis and litigation. At least with
collaborative analysis, it is clear who the group is including—
something that other approaches may obscure.
Highlighting the problem also shines attention on the need for
more and better solutions. The current state of inclusiveness in
collaborative analysis can and should be improved over time.
Doing so can achieve some of the aims of restorative

188. It is striking that 4FRI, the most lauded stakeholder collaboration in the Forest
Service, does not have tribal representatives who belong to the collaboration. A stakeholder
notes: “I would say we classically miss, and this is across the West, our tribal partners. We
have been less than successful at engaging our tribal nations, and there are a lot of reasons
for that.” BRADSHAW, supra note 8, at 39. Several factors can give rise to tribes not being
represented, although these considerations differ on a tribe-by-tribe basis given the broad
diversity of tribal resources and objectives. Further, tribes have a special status, and may
elect to become involved in resource management from a government-to-government
relationship instead, under the Section 7 Consultation requirement of NEPA. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321 to 4370m-12 (2012). Tribes electing to rely solely on this option should not, and
legally cannot, have their perspective dismissed because they did not participate in the
collaboration. Given the specialized legal status of tribes under NEPA, agencies cannot
legally overlook the obligation to consult with tribes.
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justice.189 Consciously integrating the principles of restorative
justice—such as flexibility and responsiveness—into stakeholder
collaboration may serve to improve participation among lesseradvantaged groups.
As a concluding thought on this point, I return to the initial
point that inclusion remains the central and most pressing critique
of collaborative analysis. I have some suggestions for how to
improve, but not solve, these concerns. But I do not claim to solve
them—instead to suggest that under present circumstances that
this solution likely operates better—on a relative basis—than other
risk management tools at balancing opportunities for meaningful
input with stakeholders with widely divergent access to resources.
4. Decision quality
How do collaborations perform relative to alternative
approaches? Claims about the successes of collaborations are not
relative; there is a limited empirical basis for the claim that they
work better than alternative methods. Interestingly, the same
collaboration can generate sharply different assessments of success,
as illustrated by the enthusiasm with which agency officials speak
of 4FRI contrasted with the scathing newspaper editorial on the
subject.190 This divergence highlights the absence of defined metrics
by which to judge a collaboration, either in isolation or relative to
other means of engagement.
When asked about successful and unsuccessful collaborations,
the answers of agency officials were anecdotal and involved
stories of collaborations that produced either positive or negative
outcomes. While several interviewees shared stories comparing
successful and unsuccessful collaborations, some retracted
these statements out of fear that critique would undermine
the unsuccessful collaborations that are still in operation. For
that reason, I cannot provide specific instances of
189. John Braithwaite, Relational Republican Regulation, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 124, 125
(2013); Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Restorative Justice: Thinking Relationally About Justice, in BEING
RELATIONAL: REFLECTIONS ON RELATIONAL THEORY AND HEALTH LAW 89, 89–93 (Jocelyn
Downie & Jennifer J. Llewellyn eds., 2012).
190. Compare Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 476–77, with Editorial, Our View: The Forest
Service Shouldn’t Pat Itself on the Back Yet, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:49 PM),
http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/editorial/2015/04/22/fri-deal-struck-last-getthinning/26212565/.
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unsuccessful collaborations but flag the vital point that some
collaborations fail.191
In terms of evaluating the success and failures of collaborations,
it is important to note that non-empirical feedback can be useful.
Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner have justified monetizing benefits
and harms by analogizing quantification to corporations’ use of net
present value to evaluate various projects.192 They suggest that calls
against quantification are “bizarre,” noting that CEOs regularly
engage in similar methods of assessing projects developed by
various department heads.193 This point provides an accurate, but
incomplete, account of corporate decision-making. CEOs regularly
engage with division heads and other team members—including
suppliers and customers—to evaluate how various projects and
divisions are performing. Just as a CEO would be derelict in not
requiring financial analysis of proposed projects, so too would she
fall short if she neglected ongoing project management. Thus, to the
extent that we look to real-world corporate practice to justify
quantification, so too can we find support there for how to evaluate
collaborative analysis.
A pernicious effect of collaboration is that it gives the appearance
of a democratic process, which makes the agencies’ decisions more
defensible in court. “In one example, members of the local
environmental community refused to participate in a collaboration
because they felt that previous collaborations amounted to a series
of elaborate hand-waving by the agency to give the appearance of
appropriate democratic process while giving ranchers the grazing
access they wanted.”194 In another example, a member of an
independent scientific review board examining agency action was
191. These withdrawals should cause future researchers to be thoughtful about the
incentives for self-assessment by agency officials and stakeholders in evaluating the success
of ongoing collaborations. Officials’ unwillingness to engage with negative assessments of
collaborations also raises broader questions—outside of the context of this Article—about
the degree to which norms against talking about the challenging aspects of collaboration
hampers the potential for healthy collaborations, limits the ability to meaningfully assess the
relative merit of collaboration, and may be reflective of entrenched agency culture or
location-specific norms. Importantly, the individual interviewees are operating in the
political and social realities of the situation; they do not personally bear responsibility for the
larger issues, they merely reflect them.
192. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U.
CHI. L. REV. 935, 940 (2018).
193. Id. at 941.
194. Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 485.
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surprised to learn that the local agency position was mainly
acquiescence to local ranching interests. When the member of the
review board protested that this was inconsistent with the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act and other federal laws,
the agency official acknowledged this as accurate but nevertheless
refused to budge.
Regardless of external measures of collaboration successes,
there remains a powerful but inchoate sense among agency officials
that collaborations work to advance agency goals.195 This sense of
collaboration, as reflective of democratic principles, is also
discernible in the language of the congressional acts and executive
orders requiring collaboration.
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis Fails and Collaborative Analysis Works
Cost-benefit analysis works quite well in some contexts.
Volumes of books and academic articles make this point; I do not
attempt to replicate them here. Sometimes, however, cost-benefit
analysis is poorly matched to the question at hand. Under such
conditions, policymakers can select collaborative analysis from the
buffet of available choices. It works in situations in which costbenefit analysis fails: in weighting distributions and in assessing
the social acceptability of outcomes.
First, U.S. agencies using cost-benefit analysis do not engage
different considerations for distribution—or moral—outcomes.
This is antithetical to how the creators of cost-benefit analysis
thought that government would use the tool; it can lead to
perverse results. Proponents acknowledge the limitations of
quantitative analysis in assessing risk but suggest that it is the best
available tool.196
Although generally conceived of as a data-driven tool, costbenefit analysis also reflects normative judgments. Through the
process of the distributional weighting of various inputs, value

195. A government biologist reflected this sentiment, saying, “Just as a person, I think
it is valuable to collaborate with people who are invested in decisions that you make. So I
think [stakeholder collaborations] are pretty important.” Interview 10 (on file with author).
196. For a discussion of scholarly responses to the analysis of limitations of cost-benefit
analysis, see generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 151.
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judgments shape economic outputs.197 Even ostensibly neutral
choices in cost-benefit analysis reflect distributional outcomes—
there is no escaping the normative component of policymaking.
Despite this, scholars have differed on how agencies should assign
distributional weights for over sixty years. Indeed, the issue of
distributional weighting forms a central debate within law and
economics scholarship on cost-benefit analysis today.198
Economists have long acknowledged that the person creating a
cost-benefit analysis must incorporate subjective judgments,199
judgments which economists were ill-suited to make.200 In 1961,
Otto Eckstein noted, “[I]n no event should the technician arrogate
the weighting of objectives to himself by presenting a onedimensional answer after burying the weighting process in . . .
technical details.”201 In the 1950s, mainstream neoclassical
economists and agricultural economists argued for consumer
sovereignty—that market prices and shadow prices should weight
the analysis.202 Others argued that markets failed to capture these
values because the relevant metric was a political community, not
the mere aggregation of the preferences of individual citizens.203
For example, Arthur Maass suggested that Congress should review

197. H. Spencer Banzhaf, Objective or Multi-Objective? Two Historically Competing Visions
for Benefit-Cost Analysis, 85 LAND ECON. 3, 3-4, 6 (2009) (describing Maas’ vision for costbenefit analysis taking into account distributional effects of decisions, which ultimately did
not come into fruition).
198. Weisbach, supra note 97 (overviewing scholarship arguing for and against
distributional weighting).
199. Economic history reflects that the pioneers of cost-benefit analysis were deeply
concerned with the subjective nature of weighing factors. Banzhaf, supra note 197, at 6.
200. Matthew D. Adler, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Overview, 10
REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 264, 264 (2016) (summarizing the literature from the debate
among economists on distributional weighting in the 1950s); Otto Eckstein, A Survey of the
Theory of Public Expenditure Criteria, in PUBLIC FINANCES: NEEDS, SOURCES, AND UTILIZATION
439, 449 (1961).
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., DANIEL HOROWITZ, THE ANXIETIES OF AFFLUENCE: CRITIQUES OF
AMERICAN CONSUMER CULTURE, 1939–1979, at 129–30 (2004); JAN L. LOGEMANN, TRAMS OR
TAILFINS?: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROSPERITY IN POSTWAR WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED
STATES 40 (2012); cf. JOY PARR, DOMESTIC GOODS: THE MATERIAL, THE MORAL, AND THE
ECONOMIC IN THE POSTWAR YEARS, 84–100 (1999) (discussing Canada’s experience with
consumer sovereignty in the agricultural market).
203. For a similar argument advanced by an environmental philosopher, see MARK
SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 31 (2d ed.
2008).
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programs justified by cost-benefit analysis, suggesting that only
elected representatives should make social choices.204
Questions surrounding assigning distributional weights
presumably should have shifted from theory to practice when
Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12291, requiring agencies
only to promulgate regulations for which the benefits exceeded the
costs.205 Surprisingly, despite the rapid rise of the “cost-benefit
state,” the question of distributional weighting has remained
largely theoretical. Agencies virtually never use such distributional
weighting in practice.206
Scholars have recently revived the longstanding debate about
incorporating distributional weighting into cost-benefit analysis.207
Matthew Adler has argued for weighting and proposed using the
social welfare function.208 David Weisbach, in contrast, argues that
agencies are ill-suited to address distributional questions as a
matter of institutional competency, and suggests the tax system is
a superior mechanism for addressing inequality.209 Current
proposals center around using the social welfare function,
contingent valuation,210 or surveys of people’s happiness.211 Even
ardent proponents of cost-benefit analysis acknowledge the
limitations of such quantitative measures to capture human
values such as wonder and awe.212 Some question whether

204. Arthur Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions, 80
Q. J. ECON. 208, 216–17 (1966)
205. Although cost-benefit emerged in the 1950s, it did not meaningfully intersect with
policymaking for decades. Robert Dorfman, Mathematical, or “Linear,” Programming: A
Nonmathematical Exposition, 43 AM. ECON. REV. 797, 797 (1953) (“[M]arginal analysis . . . has
led to conclusions of great importance for the understanding of many questions of social and
economic policy. But . . . this mode of analysis has not recommended itself to men of affairs
for the practical solution of their economic and business problems.”).
206. Adler, supra note 200 (“[I]t appears that distributional weights have rarely if ever
been used by [cost-benefit analysis] practitioners in the U.S. government . . . .”).
207. Weisbach, supra note 97.
208. Adler, supra note 200.
209. Weisbach, supra note 97, at 151–58.
210. Walter J. Mead, Review and Analysis of State-of-the-Art Contingent Valuation Studies,
in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 305, 307–08 (J.A. Hausman ed., 1993).
211. John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J.
1603, 1621 (2013).
212. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
786 (1994).
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distributional weighting is even truly possible given agency
resource constraints.213
But despite scholars’ efforts to capture these non-numeric
values in a cost-benefit framework, agencies often abandon costbenefit
analysis
altogether—especially
when
top-down
management cannot provide socially acceptable results. In these
circumstances, agencies often do not myopically apply top-down
risk management. In practice, agencies avoid the theoretical flaws
of cost-benefit analysis by employing different tools for conditions
of concentrated localized effects (leading to distributional issues),
uncertainty, and moral ambiguity. Agencies specifically rely on
collaborative analysis, or bottom-up policy formation—gathering
qualitative input from non-agency stakeholders who stand to
internalize the beneficial and harmful potential of various policy
outcomes.214 Despite its ubiquity in practice,215 scholars have
largely overlooked this alternative approach to risk management.216
Certainly, some scholars have suggested that only democratic
processes or input, not economic analysis, can inform certain policy
choices.217 Cass Sunstein notes: “[P]eople, in both the public and the
private sectors, are invited to provide information about the likely
consequences. For all that public officials know, private citizens
know far more. They are indispensable to a full accounting.”218
Similarly, Robert Dorfman suggests that value judgments implicit
in economic models on points like the value of human life and

213. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 74, at 152 (questioning whether distributive
weighting is, in fact, possible).
214. In some cases, particularly with technologically complex issues, inter-agency
collaborative analysis may be necessary, in which many agency stakeholders operate
together. Such inter-agency interactions have been noted in other contexts and exist already
in risk management areas, like wildfire suppression. See generally Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency
Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015); Karen M. Bradshaw, A Modern Overview of Wildfire
Law, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2010).
215. Federal agencies make thousands of risk management decisions annually under a
collaborative analysis model. See BRADSHAW, supra note 8, at 32–54.
216. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 74, at 83–87, 134–35 (overviewing alternatives to costbenefit analysis as including “intuitive” decision-making premised on the intuitions of the
agency officials, not members of the public; later noting that that some areas of life, such as
abortion, go through the political process, in which the public finds common ground by
working through disagreement); Coates, supra note 19, at 903 (listing alternatives to costbenefit analysis but not including stakeholder-driven inputs).
217. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 74, at 134–35 (describing how the political process
leads to exchange and compromise on decisions such as abortion).
218. SUNSTEIN, supra note 111.
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endangered species are not questions of fact that experts are
uniquely well-positioned to answer. Rather, they are “questions
about social values and public preferences, that only the elaborate
and clumsy procedures of democratic decision-making can
answer.”219 Others have framed such considerations in terms of the
robust debate about the relative merits of federalism and
decentralization in achieving various regulatory objectives.220
Despite some such acknowledgments, scholarly attention on
the quantitative elements of cost-benefit analysis has largely
overshadowed inquiry into the role of qualitative inputs in
cost-benefit analysis and policymaking more broadly.221 Nearuniversal enthusiasm for analytic data overestimates the potential
of these tools, which, in turn, displaces other valid approaches to
risk management.
Law and economic literatures alike lack a robust descriptive
account, theoretical basis, and normative assessment of how
agencies consult with stakeholders to determine the value
judgments embedded in policymaking. Under a collaborative
analysis framework, agencies seek direct input from the most
affected stakeholders on the very kinds of questions that costbenefit analysis cannot reach. These questions include what to do
when data is unavailable,222 how to allocate the distributional
effects of a policy223 and how to approach the moral implications of
policies.224 Collaborative analysis operates as an alternative for topdown decision-making; it is a crowdsourced variation of the kinds
of calculations that agencies would make internally under topdown models. Theoretically, it could also complement top-down

219. See ROBERT DORFMAN, Why Benefit-Cost Analysis Is Widely Disregarded and What to
Do About It, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND PUBLIC DECISIONS 372, 373 (1997).
220. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570,
572 (1996).
221. See Coates, supra note 19, at 893–94 (noting that financial regulators discuss policies
with other experts outside the agency).
222. See David Weisbach, Introduction: Legal Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty, 44
J. LEGAL STUD. S319, S319 (2015).
223. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 74, at 152 (discussing when agencies should add
distributional weights to a cost-benefit analysis); Weisbach, supra note 97 (suggesting that
cost-benefit analysis is an inappropriate vehicle for considering distributional questions).
224. See Ackerman et al., supra note 96.
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decision-making by, for example, generating more accurate inputs
into a cost-benefit analysis.225
This Article begins to fill the informational void surrounding
collaborative analysis by answering the following interrelated
questions: How do, and should, agencies consult with stakeholders
to forecast policy outcomes and inform the value-laden
distributional issues embedded in risk management policymaking?
And how should courts evaluate such collaboration?
Although the form of collaborative analysis differs from
formulaic cost-benefit analysis, the function of weighing the pros
and cons of various regulatory approaches is essentially the same.
One key difference is who is considering the pros and cons of a
potential policy. In cost-benefit analysis, it is technocratic officials;
under a collaborative analysis model, citizens are working to weigh
the relative choices. This key democratic element describes why
scholars and agency officials alike should consider the situations in
which collaborative analysis works better than cost-benefit
analysis, particularly in incorporating value judgments into policy.
D. When Collaborative Analysis Works Well and When It Does Not
Collaborative analysis provides benefits relative to cost-benefit
analysis. It is most appropriate in localized but high-stakes
decisions that elude analytical exactness. Potential benefits include
improving valuation assessments, facilitating Pareto superior
outcomes, broadening perspectives, generating alternative data,
increasing social acceptance, overcoming group polarization,
enabling resource pooling, and creating responsive policy. There
are times, however, when it would be disastrous to use
collaborative analysis. Concentrated control of decisions led by
expert input is most valuable for decisions that are: time-sensitive,
national in scope, involve clear safety considerations, and those
with complicated scientific and mathematical factors.
Of course, the threshold question of whether stakeholders or
academic experts should make decisions can lead to attempts to
draw lines to suit one’s ideological aims: Are vaccines localized to
the family or sufficiently scientific to be left to experts? Is coal

225. See supra Section II.A.4.
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production about small Appalachian communities or the global
issue of climate change?
Some academics are concerned that legitimizing collaborative
analysis dethrones the position of “experts” on vital social issues.
A workshop attendee asked, “If climate change is a debate rather
than a scientific truth, won’t that eliminate our ability to get
anything done?” Ironically, I believe the answer to that question
is no.
Taking positions that one believes are correct and then
defending those positions in litigation for decades can also be a bar
to “getting things done.” This approach produces clear winners
and losers—either “winning” side is heaping distributional
costs on the losing side. As a result, the losing side hotly protests.
Litigation or public stalemate ensues. Collaborative analysis, in
contrast, opens the door to bargaining—allowing one party to
achieve their objective, but requiring them to compensate the
losing party.
Collaborative analysis may prove most appropriate in
situations that meet the following five criteria:
(1) a controversial decision or set of decisions must be made
about a problem;
(2) that decision is characterized by deeply uncertain
risks that are difficult to quantify using analyticdata techniques;
(3) that decision is also subject to evolving social, economic,
health, or ecological conditions;
(4) the consequences of the decision will be felt by a
concentrated, identifiable set of stakeholders with deep
interests and differing perspectives; and
(5) no single agency has the resources or expertise to make
and execute a decision alone.
Indeed, I later argue that these factors form the standard that courts
should use to determine the appropriateness of agency reliance on
stakeholder input in reaching a decision.226

226. See infra p. 170.
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Some agency decisions do not require crowdsourced
qualitative inputs because the risks are diffusely spread across the
entire population. Thus, experts can discern the risks using the
democratic processes that generally inform the executive branch.
Speed limits, vaccine recommendations, airplane safety, and toxic
chemical regulations all reflect such calculi.227 Even when the
effects of decisions of considerable national importance
disproportionately disfavor a particularized group, those decisions
can be justified in terms of a broader social good.
In contrast, risks with disproportionately concentrated effects
and only local or regional benefits lend themselves to a more
directed inquiry into the welfare of those most affected by positive
or negative policy outcomes. Decisions such as whether to list a
particular species as endangered, develop a highway through a
specific state, or thin trees from a specific national forest to reduce
wildfire risk all provide examples of localized considerations. In
these contexts, agency decisions made without stakeholder input
may prove unpopular, and, consequently, be stymied by social
backlash and litigation. Collaborative analysis becomes
particularly crucial for agencies managing risks in deeply uncertain
conditions, in which the data is unavailable or inconclusive.
To what extent are collaborative analysis techniques displacing,
complementing, or inputting into cost-benefit analysis? At the most
basic level, qualitative inputs can inform technical cost-benefit
analysis. “Where benefits are difficult to quantify and monetize,
governments can work with [cost-benefit analysis] technical
experts for guidance and solicit feedback from stakeholders.”228
Collaborative analysis can also work in tandem with analyticdata techniques. For example, President Clinton issued an
Executive Order requiring agencies to address issues of
227. The judicial branch has also successfully regulated diffuse risks. Cass R. Sunstein,
On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 528
(noting success of courts in regulating “DDT and airborne lead; control of asbestos,
beryllium, and mercury; regulation of atmospheric loading, which produces acid deposition,
disclosure requirements for hazardous chemicals; and regulation in the workplace of
ethylene oxide and formaldehyde” (citations omitted)).
228. Darcy White & Torey Silloway, Cost-Benefit Analysis, EVIDENCE-BASED
POLICYMAKING COLLABORATIVE (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.evidencecollaborative.org/
toolkits/cost-benefit-analysis. The Evidence-Based Policymaking Collaborative is comprised
of the Urban Institute, Brookings Institution, American Enterprise Institute, and PewMacArthur Results First Initiative.
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environmental justice.229 Agencies could elect to satisfy this
requirement by weighting cost-benefit analysis to account for
environmental justice considerations, but they do not. Instead, they
conduct parallel cost-benefit and environmental justice analyses.
Collaborative analysis can also supplant cost-benefit analysis as a
decision-making tool in some circumstances. Council on
Environmental Quality regulations for pan-agency implementation
of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)230 note
that “the weighing of the merits and drawbacks of the
various alternatives need not be displayed in a monetary costbenefit analysis and should not be when there are important
qualitative considerations.”231
E. Considering the Relative Roles of Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Collaborative Analysis in the Climate Context
To illustrate the relative benefits of the risk management tools
of cost-benefit analysis and collaborative analysis, it is useful to
consider how agencies are using both in the real world for a single
issue: climate change.232 Given a large number of unknown factors,
agency responses include elements of risk management in actions
ranging from regulating solar geoengineering to funding flood
insurance policies in coastal areas. Scholars and commentators
have focused on two data-driven policies as the core of federal
climate change mitigation: the Clean Power Plan promulgated by
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Paris Agreement.233

229. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
note (2018).
230. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370m-12 (2018).
231. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (2019) (emphasis added).
232. See Daniel A. Farber, Catastrophic Risk, Climate Change, and Disaster Law, 16 ASIA
PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 37 (2013).
233. 40 C.F.R. pt. 60; Joby Warrick & Chris Mooney, 196 Countries Approve Historic
Climate Agreement, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2015/12/12/proposed-historic-climate-pact-nears-finalvote/; Glenn Sheriff, Burden Sharing Under the Paris Climate Agreement (Nat’l Ctr. for
Envtl. Econ., Working Paper No. 16-04, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2016-09/documents/2016-04_0.pdf.
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Several commentators have expressed grave concerns about the
eventual fate of these policy efforts within the United States.234
Collaborative analysis is emerging as the front lines of the
federal response to climate change. Richard Posner has noted that
climate change is the “poster child for the limitations of cost-benefit
analysis.”235 Climate scholars differentiate mitigation, which focuses
on lessening anthropocentric climate change by reducing
emissions, from response, which is reacting to the results of climate
change, such as heightened sea levels and increased wildfire risk.
Scholars, courts, and commentators have focused mainly on federal
mitigation efforts premised on scientific and economic modeling.236
Meanwhile, federal land and resource management agencies are on
the front lines of climate change response even when the agency
does not directly link the efforts to climate change. Such agencies
focus on response, such as protecting at-risk wildlife and
responding to catastrophic wildfires—tasks that cannot wait for
Congressional action.237 In these contexts, agencies use stakeholder
engagement to gather resources and make controversial decisions
amidst incomplete data.238
234. In 2017, President Trump announced that the United States will withdraw from
the Paris Agreement. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, WHITE HOUSE
(June 1, 2017 3:32 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/
statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord; Eli Stokols, Donald Trump Withdraws from
Paris Climate Deal Despite Allies’ Opposition, WALL STREET J. (June 2, 2017 12:44 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-to-exit-paris-climate-deal-officials-say1496343854. Parties challenged The Clean Power Plan in court; President Trump later
announced that he intended to repeal it. Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, Supreme Court
Deals Blow to Obama’s Efforts to Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epacoal-emissions-regulations.html; Robinson Meyer, Will a Reconfigured Supreme Court Help
Obama’s Clean-Power Plan Survive?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/02/antonin-scalia-clean-power-plan-obama-climatechange/462807/.
235. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 155 (2004). But see
Sunstein, supra note 18, at 381 (suggesting the use of maximin in situations, like climate
change, where there exists “genuine uncertainty, in which probabilities cannot be assigned
to the expected outcomes”).
236. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.
pdf; 40 C.F.R. pt. 60; Warrick & Mooney, supra note 233.
237. Exec. Order No. 13,653, 3 C.F.R. 330 (2014).
238. See Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 467–77; Facemire & Bradshaw, supra note 21
(presenting a case study of several agencies cooperating to manage orca pods in the Puget
Sound); infra Part I (presenting a case study of stakeholder collaboration to manage an
Alaskan caribou herd).
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President Obama issued an Executive Order anticipating the
need for collaborative analysis in this area, noting, “Managing
these risks requires deliberate preparation, close cooperation, and
coordinated planning by the Federal Government, as well as by
stakeholders, to facilitate Federal, State, local, tribal, private-sector,
and nonprofit-sector efforts to improve climate preparedness and
resilience . . . .”239 Yet, current accounts of federal climate change,
response, and risk management fail to account for the prominent
role cost-benefit analysis is playing in practice.
Agencies are using a hybrid of analytic-data and collaborative
analysis approach to create localized climate response policies. The
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service relies on collaborative tools made
with stakeholders to make species-level decisions, including
Recovery Plans, Candidate Conservation Agreements, and Habitat
Conservation Plans. The Forest Service has implemented a
nationwide Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program
to create socially acceptable policies to reduce wildfire
management costs.240 These examples highlight a broader point:
Hundreds of stakeholder groups across more than one dozen
agencies are using collaborative analysis to assess and respond to
climate change risks. Anecdotally, stakeholder groups may reduce
the polarizing effects of climate change in policy implementation.
In sum, agencies are using collaborative analysis to manage
federal climate change response actions. Certainly, data on
emissions is essential to developing EPA mitigation policies. Still,
alternative forms of data, such as observations about permafrost
melt from Alaskan Native communities, are also playing a vital role
in agency action. Existing accounts of federal climate change risk
management largely overlook the part of collaborative analysis.
Yet, collaborative analysis may be doing the bulk of the work in
response efforts. Incorporating this approach into future scholarly
inquiry may produce a more complete account of how agencies are
managing climate change response and other policy issues.

239. Exec. Order No. 13,653, 3 C.F.R. at 330.
240. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 4003, 123

Stat. 991, 1141 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 7303 (2018)).
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III. DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Judges reviewing challenges to an agency decision informed by
cost-benefit analysis or collaborative analysis should engage in a
two-step inquiry: First, the court should determine whether the
agency used an appropriate tool given the specific context of the
case. If the tool selected was appropriate, the inquiry should then
turn to the use of the tool itself. Thus, second, the court should
evaluate whether the tool was deployed correctly. Others have
thoroughly covered the subject of how judges review the
methodological correctness of cost-benefit analysis.241 I apply their
same analysis of the correct use to collaborative analysis.
Importantly, the inquiry is on the procedural elements of the tool.
The substantive outcomes and ultimate success of the usage falls
outside the scope of judicial inquiry and is instead under the control
of agencies.
Under what conditions will an agency’s reliance on
collaborative analysis satisfy judicial review that the agency’s
decision is in keeping with the Administrative Procedure Act and
other substantive statutes?
Courts should acknowledge collaborative analysis as evidence
that an agency has adequately considered a policy choice, provided
that the agency met certain procedural protections. Collaborative
analysis can complement, or even displace, top-down decisionmaking, especially under circumstances of deep uncertainty and
concentrated, identifiable potential harm.242
Integrating collaborative analysis into judicial assessment of
challenges to agency action is easier than it may appear. The first
step is that courts must decide on a case-by-case basis when
collaborative analysis satisfies the agency’s obligation to gather the
information that informs policy choices.243 As I demonstrate below,
courts have been balancing the need for cost-benefit analysis with
alternative tools of public participation since at least 1974. I
highlight the existing case law on this point and explain its
relationship to a persistent debate in risk management literature.

241. See generally, e.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 192.
242. See supra Section II.D for a five-factor test of when collaborative analysis is

most appropriate.
243. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
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Then, I argue that courts can streamline such analysis by employing
my five-factor test of circumstances in which collaborative analysis
works best.244
A line of jurisprudence within the Ninth Circuit suggests that
courts have long understood the relationship between cost-benefit
analysis and public participation. It treats them as complements—
suggesting that heavy reliance on one might excuse a lack of
reliance on the other and that each is appropriate in different
circumstances. For over fifty years, Ninth Circuit judges have
decided on the conditions under which cost-benefit analysis is
necessary and those in which other tools are better suited.
In Trout Unlimited v. Morton,245 the court held that a cost-benefit
analysis is not a necessary part of an EIS. It states:
This conclusion rests upon the hard fact that there is sufficient
disagreement about how environmental amenities should be
valued to permit any value so assigned to be challenged on the
grounds of its subjectivity. It follows that in most, if not all,
projects the ultimate decision to proceed with the projects,
whether made by Congress or an agency, is not strictly a
mathematical determination. Public affairs defy the control that
precise quantification of its issues would impose.246

Essentially, the court is saying that in situations of methodological
uncertainty a mathematical outcome would be deeply subjective.
Moreover, it acknowledges that quantification alone cannot answer
broader public affairs.
Similarly, in Columbia Basin Land Protection Association v.
Schlesinger,247 a panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled that the need for a
cost-benefit analysis in an EIS was context-dependent:
The law in this Circuit is clear that a formal and mathematically
expressed cost-benefit analysis is not always a required part of an
EIS. This is not to say that a mathematical cost-benefit analysis is
never required. If an alternative mode of EIS evaluation is
insufficiently detailed to aid the decision-makers in deciding

244. See supra Section II.D. For a discussion of expanding the degree of deference that
courts offer agencies under uncertain conditions, see Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule,
Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007).
245. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
246. Id. at 1286.
247. Columbia Basin Land Prot. Ass’n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981).
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whether to proceed, or to provide the information the public
needs to evaluate the project effectively, then the absence of a
numerically expressed cost-benefit analysis may be fatal.248

The court acknowledged the existence of alternative forms of
evaluation but did not identify what they may be.249 It cabined
reliance on such alternative methods, however, by noting that costbenefit analysis may be required in other contexts. 250
Such judicial acceptance of collaborative analysis as an
alternative to cost-benefit analysis under conditions of uncertainty
may resolve a central debate within risk management literature—
how agencies should form policy under conditions of deep
uncertainty and how courts should review such decisions.251 Judges
appropriately deem agency decisions arbitrary and capricious252
when they are premised on mischaracterizations of data or a
knowing unwillingness to analyze credible information that is
readily available.253 Yet, what should courts do when the requisite
inputs are not available?254

248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 594 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
In June 2015, the peer-reviewed Journal of Legal Studies devoted an issue to legal
decision-making in conditions of deep uncertainty. In a series of articles, preeminent scholars
discussed how agencies make decisions when the information one would want to premise a
decision on is unknown. See Weisbach, supra note 222.
252. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018). If Congress provides ambiguous statutory guidance on
a point—as is almost always the case in risk assessment—then courts afford agencies
discretion. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
253. WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2017)
(requiring the Bureau of Land Management to reassess climate change impacts of expanding
coal mines when the agency stated that its decision would have no effect on climate change
without providing a basis for those claims); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701
F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983) (vacating agency issuance of a landfill permit because the agency
failed to account for the ways in which the project would affect the juvenile striped bass); N.
Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (remanding the decision not to
list the Northern Spotted Owl to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service because the agency based
its decision on a blatant mischaracterization of scientific information provided by an expert).
254. If judges require more exactitude than agencies can provide, absurd outcomes can
result. After the Supreme Court articulated a standard requiring an agency to employ a
method that “most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity,”
Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 612 (1980) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2018)), OSHA created estimates fully knowing that the risk analysis could
vary millionfold depending on the model selected. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts
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Thus far, scholarly analysis of agency behavior and judicial
review amidst deep uncertainty has unfolded along three lines of
reasoning. Each focuses on some nexus of data and discretion. First,
empiricists tend to double down on data, calling for new models,
more funding for research, and more time to discern accurate
information.255 Second, administrative legal scholars tend to focus
on courts’ assessments of agency actions amidst uncertainty and
relaxed standards on experimental decisions.256 Adrian Vermeule
describes this as a “rationally arbitrary decision” and suggests that
even when data is not available, agencies must make some decision,
which courts should not second guess.257 Third, ecologists and
environmental law professors tend to advocate for the
Precautionary Principle, which is that avoiding known harm
should always be the tie-breaker.258
Notably, each of the existing approaches overlooks the
potential of collaborative analysis to function as a tie-breaker, a
complementary instrument used to generate, evaluate, and
incorporate ideas from expert members of the public. Agencies
faced with deep uncertainty and a lack of high-quality quantitative
data should adopt a democratic approach to risk management.
Despite a long line of such cases, the court has not yet engaged
with the specific circumstances under which alternative tools (such
as collaborative analysis) can displace cost-benefit analysis. For
this, I return to the five-factor test of when collaborative analysis
works best:

on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1402 n.74 (1992) (describing the
plurality opinion in the Benzene Case as “an ideal illustration of a confused approach to risk
assessment in the public health context”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and
Economics—and the New Administrative State, 98 YALE L.J. 341 (1988).
255. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 235. Agencies sometimes do not have the luxury of
waiting and must issue a decision within a specified time. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
256. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem
of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 92 (2016) (suggesting that
“agencies should be permitted to ‘guess’” what harms and benefits will be under conditions
of uncertainty).
257. Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions in Administrative Law, 44 J. LEGAL
STUD. S475, S475 (2015). But see Masur & Posner, supra note 192, at 950 (“To review valuations
on substantive grounds, courts need to second-guess judgments that lie at the heart of the
agencies’ expertise.”).
258. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 151, at 139–40.
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(1) a controversial decision or set of decisions must be made
about a problem;
(2) that decision is characterized by deeply uncertain
risks that are difficult to quantify using analyticdata techniques;
(3) that decision is also subject to evolving social, economic,
health, or ecological conditions;
(4) the consequences of the decision will be felt by a
concentrated, identifiable set of stakeholders with deep
interests and differing perspectives; and
(5) no single agency has the resources or expertise to make
and execute a decision alone.
Judges have been implicitly going through these factors in deciding
whether cost-benefit analysis is required.259 If they accept that a
particular case satisfies these conditions, the decisions then turn to
the procedural safeguards and democratic participation of the
stakeholder group—analysis that may be informed by law or
regulation dictating the collaborative analysis model. This
appropriately shifts judicial review away from technical analysis
of the availability of data and towards questions of
procedural fairness.
After establishing that democratic decision-making was the
appropriate tool for a particular test, the court should turn to
evaluating whether the particular application of the tool was
appropriate. It needs to assess when stakeholder collaborations
meet (or fail to meet) the procedural fairness standards embedded
in the Administrative Procedure Act and various substantive
statutes. Here, again, courts have long shown willingness to engage
in precisely such analysis.260 It strikes at the heart of what they do
as a matter of institutional competency.261

259. See cases cited supra notes 168-78, 254-632.
260. See infra notes 168-178 and related text.
261. Anya Bernstein, Differentiating Deference, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 52 (2016) (“[Courts]

have considerable experience with evaluating procedures at a relatively high level
of generality.”).
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, I challenge the orthodox view that agencies
should base their decisions on a quantified analysis of benefits and
harms. Certainly, top-down risk management informed by
quantitative analysis is the best approach in some contexts. But the
widespread consensus that cost-benefit analysis is almost always
the right approach presents an untested empirical claim that
conflicts with practice.
Identifying and describing collaborative analysis is the first step
in a broader scholarly conversation about the need to cabin
overreliance on data-driven policy. Analytic-data theory is useful
in many situations, but it can prove harmful in others. Current
over-reliance on top-down decision-making has led scholars to
overlook a widely used alternative technique. Acknowledging the
ubiquity of collaborative analysis in the administrative state invites
a variety of additional scholarship, ranging from assessment of the
efficacy of the method to variations on the tool of stakeholder
collaborations that satisfy the same function. Perhaps most
importantly, this Article serves to integrate practice and data from
other fields to challenge current legal scholarship that insists on a
sometimes-questionable policymaking tool.
Just as data-based decisions must be adequately responsive to
relevant science, so too must collaboration-based decisions
conform to some standard of acceptability. The calculus of the
procedural integrity of collaborations is far more within the realm
of courts’ abilities, however, than is second-guessing agencies’ data
analysis.262 Also, FACA clarifies that agencies may not delegate
their ultimate decision-making authority to stakeholder groups.
This ensures that, however influential a stakeholder group is, the
agency is ultimately legally and politically accountable for making
sound decisions.
Further, collaborative decisions do not override the distinct
procedural protections embedded into NEPA and substantive
elements of other statutes, like the Endangered Species Act. Indeed,
it is within the confines of the overlapping statutory regimes—
imposing requirements that decisions incorporate “best available
262. Cf. Masur & Posner, supra note 192, at 950 (arguing that courts can and should
engage in a heightened review of cost-benefit analysis).
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science”—that Congress guards against irresponsible stakeholder
or agency action. Notice-and-comment periods, which some
statutes require, continue to play an essential role in democratic
accountability by incorporating the voices of people who care about
the decision but are not members of the collaboration. Collectively,
these statutory guideposts cabin the most serious concerns
about collaborative analysis, inappropriately displacing analyticdata analysis.
A fundamental question underlying democratic decisionmaking is: Who gets a seat at the table? Agencies are struggling to
make such determinations on a case-by-case basis, as with the
founders of the WACHWG deciding to allocate each regional
group of Alaskan Native Communities one of twenty seats.
Alternatively, the group could have granted one position to each of
the forty to fifty communities, or a single place to represent all
Alaskan Native Communities. Such decisions influence substantive
outcomes. Decisions made by the WACHWG would likely be far
more favorable to Alaskan Native interests if each of the forty to
fifty communities received a position, and there was only a single
seat reserved for non-native hunting guides. In other words,
deciding who is eligible to participate, and to what degree, is a vital,
sometimes determinative question in collaborative analysis.
Scholarly work on answering this question is not only theoretically
interesting, but also important to informing judicial inquiry
surrounding the procedural fairness of stakeholder groups.
Similarly, the various tools of democratic decision-making are
relatively poorly defined. By contrast, scholars tend to be more
familiar with the analytic-data tools of top-down risk
management—such as cost-benefit analysis, feasibility analysis,
and min-max—and the corresponding degrees of judicial
deference. Although ecologists and social scientists have provided
some typologies of collaborative governance, legal analysis of the
rules governing various tools, and judicial deference paid to them,
is relatively undeveloped.263 Future scholarship may engage with
whether, and how, voting processes work in real-world
collaborative groups and the lengths to which judicial inquiry of
263. For a rough typology of various democratic decision-making tools agencies use—
including, but going well beyond, stakeholder collaborations—see BRADSHAW, supra note 8,
at 20–24.
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procedural fairness should track different tools within the cannon
of democratic decision-making.
More broadly, the study of collaborative analysis also
contributes to the persistent, ongoing debate about the relative
merits of federalism versus decentralization in agency
policymaking.264 It acknowledges that analytic decision strategies
are necessary for some contexts but utterly inappropriate in others.
This mirrors a generalized consensus—extending beyond the risk
management arena—that some categories of decisions are best
suited to collaborative analysis.
Behavioral economics had a considerable effect on legal
scholars, some of whom now believe that people’s decision-making
biases render them ineffective at making decisions. In conditions of
imperfect government data assessment, however, resource users
may be best positioned to assess conditions and forecast resource
availability and social responses to various policy choices. The
iterative nature of collaboration—relative to the single-shot nature
of regulation—suggests that the decision-making body acts as a
system that can continuously update itself and adapt to new
information and changed conditions. Further, the integration of
non-scientific factors to influence policy decisions makes sense in
situations where the data or models are deeply uncertain. Updating
law and theory to integrate collaborative analysis has considerable
potential to improve agency function.

264. Esty, supra note 220.

723

001.BRADSHAW_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

724

3/25/20 9:02 PM

2019

